Separation of religion and state is the slogan heard from time to
time in public debate in Israel. It is not, however, the actual policy of any
party or political group. The slogan is raised as the expression of a
theoretical position in "secular" circles, but its advocates do not regard it
seriously as a political demand to be realized in the present. They do not
attempt to clarify its meaning nor do they propose a plan for embodying it in
law and government. Their struggle is limited to episodic clashed with religious
or pseudo-religious aspects of administrative behavior or legislative action. At
the same time, official religious Jewry, its spiritual leaders and political
representatives, who rejected the idea of separation and supported the existing
relation between state and religion, never accounted for their own position. It
is doubtful whether they have ever critically examined it. A struggle over the
relation of religion and the state has never really been conducted between the
religious and secular in Israel. Out of sheer opportunism, both sides accept the
reality of a secular state with a religious façade.
In these pages the demand for separation of religion and state
will be presented from a religious viewpoint, from which the present relations
between the state and the Torah appear as Hillul Hashem, contempt of the Torah,
and a threat to religion.[1]Two prefatory
remarks are necessary in order to clarify this position.
First, the religion with which we are concerned is traditional
Judaism, embodies in Torah and Mitzvoth, which claims sovereignty over the life
of the individual and the life of the community - not a religion which can be
satisfied with formal arrangements grafted on to a secular reality.
Second, the state of which we speak is contemporary Israel, a
state defined by its manner of coming into being in 1948 and its mode of
existence from then onward - not the state as an ideal. In other words, the
relation of religion and state is not discussed here as an article of faith. We
shall not inquire as to what, in principle, should be the relation between
"religion" (in general) and "state" (in general), nor seek to demarcate "the
holy," "the secular," the historical, or the metaphysical essence of the Jewish
people as the people of the Torah. We are concerned with determining what sort
of political-social organization would be in the religious interest in the
existing situation.
The state of Israel that came into being in 1948 by the common
action, effort, and sacrifices of both religious and secular Jews was an
essentially secular state. It has remained essentially secular and will
necessarily continue to be such, unless a mighty spiritual and social upheaval
occurs among the people lining here. The secularity of this state is not
incidental but essential. The motivation and incentive for its foundation were
not derived from the Torah. Its founders did not act under the guidance of the
Torah and its precepts. It is not conducted by the light of the Torah. That "the
state of Israel is a state ruled by law and not a state governed by Halakhah" is
recognized by all - including the religious - as the principle governing the
activity and administration of this state, in which official religious Jewry has
participated since its establishment.[2]Whether we are religious or secular, we brought this state
about by dint of our common efforts as Jewish patriots, and Jewish patriotism -
like all patriotism - is a secular human motive not imbued with sanctity.
Holiness consists only in observance of the Torah and its Mitzvoth: "and you
shall be holy to your God." We have no right to link the emergence of the state
of Israel to the religious concept of messianic redemption, with its idea of
religious regeneration of the world or at least of the Jewish people. There is
no justification for enveloping this political-historical event in an aura of
holiness. Certainly, there is little ground for regarding the mere existence of
this state as a religiously significant phenomenon.
Even from the standpoint of religious awareness and faith, this
Jewish state is in the same category as the kingdoms of Yarov'am, Ahab,
Menasseh, and Herod were in their time. A person does not and may not sever his
connection with a criminal parent, nor may a parent repudiate a son who has gone
astray. Likewise, the Jew, including the religious Jew, may not dissociate
himself from this state. However, though we fully recognize its legitimacy, it
is necessary to confront the secular state and society with the image of a
religious society and state, that is of a state in which the Torah is the
sovereign authority. What is truly illegitimate is the surreptitious
introduction, by administrative action of religious items into the secular
reality so as to disguise its essential secularity.
The demand for the separation of religion from the existing
secular state derives from the vital religious need to prevent religion from
becoming a political tool, a function of the governmental bureaucracy, which
"keeps" religion and religious institutions not for religious reasons but as a
concession to pressure groups in the interest of ephemeral power-considerations.
Religion as an adjunct of a secular authority is the antithesis of true
religion. It hinders religious education of the community at large and
constricts the religious influence on its way of life. From a religious
standpoint there is no greater abomination than an atheistic-clerical regime. At
present we have a state - secular in essence and most of its manifestations -
which recognizes religious institutions as state agencies, supports them with
its funds, and, by administrative means, imposes, not religion, but certain
religious provisions chosen arbitrarily by political negotiation. All the while,
it emphasizes its rejection of guidance by Torah ("a state ruled by law, not by
Halakhah"). We have a rabbinate invested by the state, which receives its
appointment, authority, and pay from the secular government and confines itself,
therefore, to the functions that this government allots to it. It is a religion
whose position in the state parallels that of the police, the health
authorities, the postal services, or customs. There is no greater degradation of
religion than maintenance of its institutions by a secular state. Nothing
restricts its influence or diminishes its persuasiveness more than investing
secular functions, with a religious aura; adopting sundry religious obligations
and proscriptions as glaring exceptions into a system of secular laws; imposing
an arbitrary selection of religious regulations on the community while refusing
to obligate itself and the community to recognize the authority of religion; in
short, making it serve not God but political utility.
This is a distortion of reality, a subversion of truth, both
religious and social, and a source of intellectual and spiritual corruption. The
secular state and society should be stripped of their false religious veneer.
Only then will it become possible to discern whether or not they have any
message as a Jewish state and society. Likewise, the Jewish religion should be
forced into taking its stand without the shield of an administrative status.
Only then will its strength be revealed, and only thus will it become capable of
exerting an educational force and influencing the broader public.
Against this argument, religious circles claim that such
separation would make the social and perhaps even physical existence of
religious Jews within the secular state and society unbearable and compel Jews
to forsake their religious way of life. These arguments stem, to some extent,
from naïveté, from misunderstanding the implications of separation of religion
and state for the conduct and administration of state and society. To some
extent they only pretend naïveté and veil vested interests. In effect, such
separation would not in the least narrow the possibilities open to religious
Jews of living according to their wont. It would even foster the expressions of
religious life in the community at large. Let us attempt to gain a realistic
view of the consequences of separating religion and state.
The religious institutions will be conducted by the
religious community with religious considerations in view; in the interest of
religion and not in conformity with the dictates of a secular authority.
Officials exercising religious functions will no longer be appointed by
governmental authorities not subject to the Torah. Religious projects and
institutions will not be administered by government agencies. Religious Jewry
will have a rabbinate that is not an "official state rabbinate," an institution
which had earned only contempt in Jewish history.[3]This rabbinate wills constitute an authentic religious
leadership rather than an arm of the secular state. It will be able to speak
with the voice of the Torah and Halakhah on every matter and every public issue
in which there is something to be said, not only in the restricted domain
allotted it by the secular authority. This would put an end to the intolerable
situation in which the rabbinate - as a governmental agency - must refrain from
public statements on what is the most urgent religious issue of the day, that of
secular and religious education, and be silent when Jewish children are seduced
or forces into abandoning their religion.[4]The change would eliminate the disputes and clashes among
religious functionaries on an atheistic government - between a Minister of
Religions and a Chief Rabbi - whose squabbles concern not Torah issues or
questions of halakhic import but distribution of the petty authority granted
them by a secular regime.
Who will maintain the agencies required by the religious
community? In the first place, the religious community will do so through its
own funding, as was done at all times wherever an organized religious community
existed. To be sure, this requires sacrifices. But the religious community has
always and everywhere borne this burden as something to be taken for granted, an
inseparable aspect of its religious existence. Even the poorest community in a
remote village in Yemen or Libya maintained its rabbis, ritual slaughter,
synagogues, and cemeteries, without the help of the United Jewish Appeal or an
appropriation from the imam or the sultan - and never complained that this was
beyond its capacity. Only in the state of Israel, which transformed religion
into a function of the secular government, has the religious community been
corrupted and become accustomed to financial dependence upon a secular
authority. If the situation is reversed, there is not doubt that after a short
period of confusion which will follow the separation of religion from the state,
the self-respect of the religious community will be restored, and it will once
again maintain and support its own agencies as religious institutions. In this
respect we can learn from parallel developments in the Gentile world. In France
during the nineteenth century, as a result of the Napoleonic Concordat that made
the religious institutions functionaries of the state, the Catholic Church and
clergy were subject to scorn and contempt. In the twentieth century, after the
separation of church and state, when the church and its personnel had to be
supported solely by contributions of the believers, its prestige grew and its
influence increased.
It is necessary to ascertain whether, from a religious standpoint,
the Jewish religious institutions should or may accept financial support from
the secular state. This writer believes that religious Jewry should - in the
interest of fostering respect for the Torah - refuse to accept such support.
Should the religious community, upon due deliberation, decide otherwise, it
could be entitled to such support even after the separation of religion and
state by virtue of its status and taxpayers who share the burden of the state
and its services.
The religious councils will be chosen by all religious Jews
who are interested in their activities. They will cease to be affiliated with
the Ministry of Religions. The abolition of the Ministry of Religions will free
Judaism and religious Jews from a religious anomaly - now passed over in silence
by the religious establishment - of supporting institutions of other religions
(some of which are actually idolatrous, according to the strict law of the
Torah) with the money of Jews.[5]Without a
Ministry of Religions, and without state funding of Jewish religious
institutions, our democratic state will be free of the obligation to support the
institutions of other religions. Members of all religions will maintain their
own clergy.
The Sabbath. In the present integration of religion and
state, the Sabbath is desecrated by the state. The law recognizes the right of
every person to desecrate the Sabbath publicly, for example by driving. The
police and courts were called in more than once to protect this right - even
when official religious Jewry, with all its parties, participated in the
government and shared responsibility for the actions of the police. The
prohibition of public transportation on the Sabbath is only a sop to religious
Jewry, a face-saving device. The hypocrisy of this arrangement, which degrades
religion and reveals the "religious" stand in a ridiculous light, attains its
peak in Haifa. Religious Jewry, which is represented in the city council, shares
responsibility for operating the bus transportation on Sabbath - in exchange for
participating in the coalition governing the city council. Yet it is ready to
fight against operating the subway on the Sabbath - presumably because of a
political agreement on maintenance of a status quo in religious matters.
The existing law does not recognize the sanctity of the Sabbath.
It removes the definition of "rest" from halakhic jurisdiction and vests it in
the secular authority or in inter-party agreement. There is no basis for the
fear that the state, after religion is separated from it, will make any change
in the Sabbath law, which establishes the workers' right of rest and the
obligation to close stores and work places on the Sabbath. The extent to which
this Sabbath rest will correspond to the religious prescriptions concerning the
Sabbath will depend on public opinion and the influence of religious Jewry in
the public matters. This influence will, in all likelihood, be increased upon
separation of religion and state with the growth in prestige and educational
effectiveness of religion.
Sabbath and Kashruth in the army. The Sabbath and Kashruth
(dietary laws) are observed in the army, but not in consequence of the formal
interlocking of religion with the laws of the state; rather, because so very
many Jews could not serve in the army were they not assured of the Sabbath rest
and kosher food. The state could not draft the entire Jewish population for
defense of the state in one unified national army if it did not provide them. It
cannot maintain a separate "religious army" alongside the general army.[6]These provisions of the army will not change
even after the separation of religion and state. It should be noted that even
now the religious prohibitions of desecrating the Sabbath and eating nonkosher
food are not enforced in the army, because every soldier is permitted use of one
mess-tin for meat and milk. The army only enables every soldier who so desires
to rest on the Sabbath and to eat kosher food.
Law of marriage and divorce. It is erroneous to argue that
the institution of civil marriage by the state will divide the Jewish people
into two nations which will not be able to intermarry. Civil marriage will not
annul the institution of religious marriage. Whoever so argues overlooks -
deliberately or out of ignorance - the hundreds of thousands of religious Jews
in Western lands, who conduct their family life according to the Torah in states
which recognize civil marriage and divorce (as in England) or even require them
(as in Imperial or Weimar Germany). A Torah-observing Jew will continue to marry
according to Jewish law and if, unfortunately, the couple divorce, they will do
this according to the law of Moses and Israel. Those who rebel against religion
will be content with registering their "marriage" or "divorce" in a government
office in a form that will be determined by law. Here the two terms are put in
quotation marks, because from a halakhic standpoint, no marriage took place.
Consequently, upon separation there is no need of divorce. In the absence of
halakhically recognized marriage there is no question of Mamzeruth, since a
child born out of wedlock is not disqualified from marrying.[7]The rabbinical courts do not seem to have dealt seriously
and pertinently with the halakhic significance of "civil marriage" for Jewish
couples that explicitly refuse marriage according to the Torah. One may question
whether such a marriage has any halakhic force.[8]The ruling, which would reduce the incidence of Mamzeruth
to a minimum, would be a great improvement over the present situation under the
Law of Marriage and Divorce which, given the sexual practices of considerable
portions of the community, tends to aggravate the problem of Mamzeruth in
Israel. Prohibition of adultery concerns only those involved and can hardly be
grounded today in moral or social considerations; moreover, it is a purely
religious proscription. Consequently, many sectors of the population where the
authority of religious law has been undermined - and they include many very
respectable people - do not consider adultery immoral. Hence those who force
religious marriage on people who do not recognize its sanctity are violating the
proscription of placing a stumbling block before the blind. Men and women are
led into a far more serious halakhic transgression than that of living together
without religious marriage.
In the face of these realities, the fear of dividing the nation as
a result of rescinding the Law of Marriage and Divorce is ridiculous and perhaps
insincere. Can a Jewish man and woman marry, if one of them sees himself bound
by the laws of family purity, and the other does not accept them? Theses
precepts are much more stringent than the prohibition of cohabitation with an
unmarried woman. Furthermore, religious Jewry, more than any other sector of the
nation, is committed to the view that the state of Israel is not merely the
state of those now living in it but is the Jewish state, that is, the state of
all Jews, who are all potential citizens. Did religious Jewry, in its fear of
Mamzeruth on the one hand and concern for the unity of the nation on the other,
think of the problems that will arise the moment - perhaps not so far away -
when masses of Jews from the U.S.S.R. or the United States will stream to
Israel? These Jews have conducted their lives for two generations, or even more,
in accordance with the legal provisions and social patterns of their countries
or residence. It will not prove possible to trace their precise family status.
How does religious Jewry think it could assure the unity of the nation in those
conditions?
The issue of the separation of religion and state also includes
the problem of "who is a Jew"? - a problem which could arise only as a result of
confused categories. Transient and changing interests of coalition governments
have led them, on one occasion, to an attempt to abrogate the
historical-traditional criteria of belonging to the Jewish people, and at other
times to abandon this attempt. If the state of Israel were formally and legally
recognized as secular, the problem would not arise at all, for a secular state
does not determine the "Jewishness" or "non-Jewishness" of its citizens. It
recognizes only "citizens" and "non-citizens," and the concept "Jew" would
retain its historic-traditional connotation. The (momentary) retreat of the
government from its position on this question - a retreat which the religious
parties regard as their victory - shows that the status of religion in the state
is determined more by the communal consciousness and the pressure of public
opinion in Israel and abroad than by the organs of the state. Releasing religion
from its integration in the political-secular system is the most effective way
to strengthen religious consciousness and its influence on the public.
Religious education. There is no direct link between the
status and extent of religious education on the one hand, and the legal position
of religion in the state on the other. Such a connection exists necessarily only
in the framework of a totalitarian regime. It does not obtain in a liberal
polity, in which social reality is not identical with the official political
order. Among well-ordered and enlightened states, all which have compulsory
education laws, educational systems differ considerably in uniformity and in
degree of involvement of the government in the pedagogic process; compare, for
example, England, France, Germany (of Weimar and Bonn), Holland, and the United
states, in all of which religious education flourishes. In the United States,
where the Constitution and the Supreme Court forbid support of religious
education by the state, there is a network of thousands of Catholic elementary
and high schools, numbering four million pupils, which are not inferior in level
and achievement to the secular public schools of the states and cities. In other
countries the policy of every school is determined by the parents' committee,
and within the broad framework established by law, the education authority
accedes to the parents' preferences. The common feature of all these systems is
that the secular state is not in control of religious education and religious
education is not one of its functions; it is set up and maintained by religious
community that desires it - whether this be a community with a ramified church
organization or one represented by parents of a specific school. The extent of
state support of these schools is determined by law. Their main support depends
largely on the will of the religious community and the strength of its religious
commitment.
In all these matters the state of Israel could emulate the
best-governed nations, and, from a Jewish religious standpoint, it is most
desirable that it do so. The fear that without governmental backing religious
education could not support itself or would be curtailed - the fear of
educational independence - reflects the moral failing of the religious community
fostered by the dependence of religion on the state. In the past, religious Jews
customarily devoted great efforts to education their children and were prepared
to pay the price. A condition for religious revitalization, without which there
is no future for religious education in any of its forms, is the revival of
initiative and readiness of religious Jews to undertake this burden.
Removal or religious education from control of the secular state
and its transfer to the religious community - with or without financial support
of the state - will open new prospects for expansion and enable it to reach
broader strata of the population. The existing law, which purports to obligate
the state to support religious schooling, is in reality a legal arrangement for
confining such education within the limits the secular authority is prepared to
tolerate, and to localities in which the secular authority is willing to forego
its control in favor of the religious population. In return, the religious
public refrains from serious struggle for expansion of religious education to
include more children. Cases have even been recorded of explicit agreements over
percentage quotas of pupils to be allotted to religious and to secular schools.
Only by conducting independent religious schooling can Jewish religion appear on
the public scene in its full potential, communicate its message in its entirety,
and exert the influence of which it is capable.
The separation of religion and state would involve neither
withdrawal of religion to a secluded niche nor removal of religious Jewry from
the political scene. On the contrary, it would signify the beginning of the
great confrontation between Judaism and secularism within Jewry and the Jewish
state and initiate a genuine struggle between them over the hearts and minds of
the citizens. Religion as an independent force will be the principal opposition
to the regime of the secular state, an opposition which can present a clear and
unambiguous alternative in all areas of life in the state and society.
[1]Hillul Hashem, an
expression derived from a locution used by the prophet Ezekiel and meaning
desecration of God's name, is used as a derisive designation for the actions of
pious Jews which disgrace their religion – Ed.
[2]"Israel is a state ruled by
law, not by Halakhah" was a favorite dictum of Ben Gurion. – Ed.
[3]The allusion is to the
rabbis appointed by the Czarist government to further its policy with respect to
the Jews. – Ed.
[4]The reference is chiefly to
the period of mass immigration in the early fifties, when many immigrant
children from religious homes were arbitrarily assigned to secular educational
institutions rather than to schools of the religious stream within the state
educational system – Ed.
[5]The Ministry of Religions
maintains most of the religious facilities and pays the salaries of the duly
constituted religious functionaries of the Moslem and Druse communities. It
participates in the maintenance and construction of buildings serving the
religious purposes of Moslems and Christians – Ed.
[6]Such a situation obtained in
the Hagganah, the Jewish defense force which operated under the conditions of
mandatory rule. Religious members were organized in separate units in which they
were able to avoid unnecessary desecration of the Sabbath – Ed.
[7]The Halakhah does not
recognize a status of bastardy. A child of an unmarried mother is legitimate in
every respect. However, a child born of an incestuous or adulterous relation,
called "mamzer", can only marry a person of like status – Ed.
[8]The question whether, from a
halakhic standpoint, a couple wed by civil marriage requires a halakhically
valid divorce in order that the wife may remarry has been the subject of
controversy among rabbis. Because of the doubt concerning the status of such a
couple, the tendency has been to require halakhic divorce in such cases. The
point made in the text is that the explicit refusal of the couple to be
halakhically wedded may make it unnecessary to require a halakhic divorce. It
eliminates the chief ground for its need – Ed.
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