[Much of what is presented in my paper is an analytical interpretation of sorts, of the religious thought of Leibowitz. I am deeply indebted to my wife, Naomi Kasher, for her continuous criticism and encouragement]

Beit Shammai say Heaven was created first and afterwards the earth was created... Beit Hillel say Earth was created first and afterwards heaven[1].

The precept relating to idolatry is equal in importance to all the other precepts put together... Acceptance of idolatry is tantmount to repudiating the whole Torah... And whoever denies idolatry confesses his faith in the whole Torah[2].

My point of departure will be theological. Judaism never had an official theology, but there is good reason to suppose that may, among the multitude which formed "the congregation of believers", held some kind of view - either clear or clouded, the handiwork of a thinker or of a parrot - with a theological mush at its center - no excellent delicacy perhaps, but at least a pale pudding. This way or that, theological statements were never lacking on the lips of the common believer. The philosophizers of this congregation of believers had a problem - how is it possible to describe Him in the language which describes us and our world? The various theories of attributes are each a proposal for the solution of this problem. The first idea that I intend to offer in this paper is the nucleus of a different theory of attributes. What is the function filled by such a theorys - given a simple theological statement of the type "God is so and thus" - perfectly good, omniscient, omnipotent, perfect, all-rulling authority, etc. - the theory should determine the meaning of the statement, if indeed it has such a meaning.
Various famed theories set differing restrictions upon the predicates that are meaningfully applicable to God; Maimonides, for instance, allowed the "negation of absences".
However, if we are dealing with theological statements the subject of which denotes God and the predicate of which is an attribute, we are under no obligation to limit ourselves to the predicate alone; a theory of attributes is under no obligation to be a theory about attributes only. In order to make the understanding of theological statements possible, I propose the introduction of a standard modification of the subject and a standard modification of the predicate, producing a new statement that will be equally applicable to all things.

The modification formula is as follows: given, in a simple theological sentence - some specific predicate attributed to God, the given predicate will be replaced by its negation and instead of being attributed to God, the new predicate will be attributed to each of the things in the world. For example: the given sentence is - "God is necessary". Instead of discussing God we will discuss each of the things in the world, and instead of the predicate "necessary" we will use its negation, the predicate "not necessary". Instead of the sentence, "God is necessary" we will then receive the sentence, "Each of the things in the world is not necessary." It seems to me that this sentence is much less proble- matic than the original which is replaced by it. In order to give the modification formula a simple name, I will disregard a few logical subtleties and call it "Constituent Negation" as if we had negated the subject and the predicate, each independently, and then conjoined these negations.
To allow a closer scrutiny of the proposal, I will supply a few more examples of the translation of theological language to this other language - perhaps a metaphysical one, but not a theological one - a translation effected by constituent negation.
Instead of the sentence from the principles, "God is the author and guide of every thing that has been created."[3]We receive, through constituent negation and additional slight repairs, "None of the things in the world is the author and guide of all things in the world." While the original sentence is not open to complete literal comprehension, its translation, obtained through negation of constituents, clearly allows a philosophical discussion that is devoid of mystery. I shall take one step in the direction of such a discussion. The epithet "author and guide" has both a factual denotation and a normative denotation. On the factual level the guide or leader is he who determines the rules of action and carries them out; on the normative level, the leader is he who is worthy of being followed. There is nothing in the worId which is worthy of being followed with unlimited loyalty, be it human or otherwise - this is the normative interpretation given by the negation of constituents, to part of the well known first principle. While the sentence from the principles is unfathomable, its normative interpretation can be illuminated in a philosophical discussion. The same holds for the less interesting factual interpretation of the same part of the first principle. A second sentence in the principles states, among other things. "The Creator ... there is no unity in any manner like His."[4] A translation of this sentence, using constituent negation and making small stylistic repairs, will produce the sentence, "In all cases there are unities like those of each thing in the world." Nothing in the world has its own essential qualities, its own distinctive qualities. Again the double negation has transferred us from obscurity to clarity. While the original sentence is not open to literal comprehension, its translation is obviously the bread and butters of many a philosopher including some of the most lucid among them. Even logicians have used the question of essence as a topic of much interest.

The third principle says of God that "he cannot be conceived of by mortal conceivers." What will negation of this sentence's constituent's produce? - "Each thing in the world is not such that it cannot be conceived of by mortal conceivers," or, in other words, each thing in the world is open to full human understanding. This statement is, basically, a fascinating claim about science, philosophy and all other means for human under- standing, maintaining that, together, they are unlimited in their comprehension of the world. This statement is open to both scientific[5] and philosophical discussion.

I have translated the first three principles without taking a stand as to the acceptability of the resultant statement. I will now cite a few more examples in which such a stand may easily be taken.

A.
Is God in the world? - I do not know how to answer the question itself, but when we translate it by means of constituent negation we receive the statement that each thing in the world is not in the world. If we presume that there are things in the world, we can conclude from the resultant statement that there are things in the world that are not in the world. This is a contradiction and we are therefore left with two alternatives - either we presume that the world is empty or we reject the statement obtained by translation, together with its original. Given that I a m in the world - so I at least suppose - I consider the contention that God is in the world, as it is presently translated, as an incorrect statement. I am prepared, if you insist upon-it, to relate all of my conclusions about the translation, to the original theological sentence, but I will take responsability for what is said of such a theological sentence, only if you view it with me through negation of constituents.

God has been said to be simple. Again, in order to understand this we shall take a look at the product offered us by constituent negation - "Each thing in the world is not simple." Now, if you are an atomist of any sort, you will surely reject that, but if you believe in general continuity, you will surely accept it. This way or that, you will have no difficulty in taking a stand. In the previous example ("God is in the world") we arrived at a logical contradiction and we therefore took a stand on logical grounds; in this example ("God is simple") we can take a stand on grounds of a general physical theory. In the next example I will take a stand on grounds of opinion.
One of the principles states that God merits prayer. Where does the negation of constituents lead us this time? - "There is nothing in the world that merits praying to." Needless to say, the obtainment of this normative statement is an essential component in the discipline of Judaism and we shall return to this below. I will cite two more examples of constituent negation; the resultant statements will be of religious importance.

One of the statements is a difficult one - "God merits awe and love." The negation of constituents translates simple theological sentences, so we will break down this sentence into the following two components -"God merits awe" and "God merits love". In order to give meaning to the translation, we will analyse the concepts of awe and love according to Kant in his religion within the limits of reason alone. If awe is the disposition in obedience to the law from bounden duty, i. e. from respect for the law, and love is the disposition to obey the law, from one's own free choice and from approval of the law, then negation of the constituents will lead to the following, important, normative statement - "Nothing in the world merits obedience to its law resulting from an acknowledgement of bounden duty and nothing in the world merits obedience to its laws of one's free choice and approval. "In other words - there is in the world no man, society, state, institution of any kind, meriting obedience to its laws from an acknowledgement of bounden duty or out of free choice and approval.
If, from this statement, you derive the religious opposition to absolute obedience to any man, whatever his virtues and laws, the religious opposition to complete compliance with any society, whatever its laws and properties, and the religious opposition to blind submission to any state, whatever its laws and orders - you will, no doubt, be right, but the full strength of the religious opposition will not yet be exhausted; these oppositions are common to both religion and ethics, and are one and the same. Ethics itself is a human institution, so that he who accepts our translation of the statement that God merits awe and love will reach the markedly religious conclusion that the institution of ethics does not merit obedience to its laws from an acknowledgement of bounden duty, nor does it merit obedience to its laws out of free choice and approval.

Yet the institution of religion is also a human institution in the world. True, its values are unique and its loyal followers cannot be loyal in the same way to any othe r institution, still, its mode of existence in the world is the same as the mode in which the ethical institution exists in the world. If nothing in the world merits obedience to its laws from an acknowledgement of duty or of one's own free choice and approval, then neither does the religious institution merit obedience to its laws in this manner or that. This is a conclusion that no man among the "community of believers" will be able to accept. Therefore, if we adopt the method of constituent negation as well as the Kantian analysis of both love and awe, we are compelled to avoid the acceptance of this statement.

Seeing that our translation by negation of constituents, of the statement that God does not merit awe and love, using Kant's analysis, will result in the statement that everything in the world merits obedience to its laws from an acknowledgement of duty and of one's own free choice and approval, it is clear that ultimately, in the theological language, we will apply to God neither the attribute "merits awe" and "merits love" nor their negations, as Kant interprets them. Notice that if we thought of the religious Iaw giver as not being in the world, we could then say of the laws of the religious institution that they were the laws of someone outside of the world, and we could accept the statement that none of the things in the world merit obedience to their laws from an acknowledge - ment of duty or of one's own free choice and approval. There is, then, a fast bond connecting the love of God and the awe of Him with divine legislation. In places where the latter is not to be found the former will not be found.

B.
Is it possible to maintain the religious idea of opposing all absolute obedience to man, state or nature, without sawing off the branch upon which the human institution of religion rests? In order to answer this question we will study the following theological sentence - "God merits worshipping." Negation of the constituents of this entence leads us to the statement that there is nothing in the world that merits worshipping. Therefore, there exists no bligation to worship the king, no obligation to worship the state, no obligation to worship man! Here is the rejection of all forms of slavery, the denial of all of the various shades of fascism, and - noting the difference - a rejection of ethics. Doesn't this imply a refutation of religion itself? - I think not. People who blindly obey the laws of their state, whatever they may be, are not worshipping the fascist idea, but the state - a thing in the world which this idea attempts to make holy. It is not the ideas' attempting sanctification that are worshipped, but the things that these ideas attempt to sanctify. Ethics is not being worshipped when its rules are observed with complete loyalty, what's being worshipped is the thing expressed by the ethics - man, in the supreme position. Therefore religion, the human institution, is not worshipped, and there is nothing in the world that is put in the supreme position by religion. There is, then, noting in the world that is worshipped when the laws of religion are obeyed, according to the Jewish pattern. (I can say nothing here about the Moslem pattern, which is, I am told, similar).

Arriving at the idea that there is nothing in the world that should be worshipped, we have come very close to the second idea which is central to the view I am presenting here; we have come very close but we have not yet reached the heart of the matter.
There is no obligation to worship the state, we are under no obligation to worship man, no one is under any obligation to worship nature, but perhaps the permission (to do so) is given? Oviously, the absence of an obligation does not necessarily imply the existence of an opposite obligation. I am not obliged to talk; am I, as a result, obliged to be silent? The transition from denying all obligation to the obligation to deny, will get us where we want to go: not only is there no obligation to worship the state - there is an obligation not to worship it; not only are we under no obligation to worship man - we are obliged not to worship him; not only is no one under any obligation to worship nature - not to worship it is an obligation. To make a generalization: adherence to the law and the precepts is the unique Jewish expression of an acknowledgement of the obligation not to worship anything in the world. Furthermore, the most marked expression of acknowledgement of the obligation not to worship the king, will be a breach of the king's ordinance, made consciously and clearly. It can therefore be said of the law and the precepts that they reflect the Jewish war against all types of idol worship (avodah zara) - not only of the Jews of Persia and Egypt it was said in the Talmud (Megillah 13 etc.) "For anyone who repudiates idolatry is called 'a Jew',"[6] but of all Jews it was said there - "Idolatry is so heinous that he who rejects it is as though he admits (the truth of) the whole law"[7] (Torah) (Kiddushin 40 and in other places). The repudiation of idolatry, though, does not consist of a single, solemn vow of disbelief. It consists of the exhaustive, routine and perpetual system of laws comprising the practical precepts.

Seven hundred and seventy faces idolatry hath and there is no gully in which some idol or another has not entrenched itself. If it was not for the battle waged against any human inclination to worship something in the world, it could be said of idolatry that no place is free of it. "If the name of every idol were to be specifically mentioned all skins in the world would not suffice."[8]

Pascal writes in his Pensees (paragraph 640) that the Jews preserve their scriptures and love them, but don't understand them. Perhaps he was right but most probably not for the reasons he maintained. I shall now try to point out what seems to me to be the central objective of the law and its precepts - total war against any possible manifestation of idolatry - using a few examples.

I shall not repeat for you what is well known - the explicit prohibition of making other gods - but supply some indirect evidence, going from the lighter cases to the more serious ones. The words of Maimonides in Moreh Nebokhim (3, 48), about the prohibition of meat in milk, are common knowledge - (the prohibition) "I think... is somehow connected with idolatry, forming perhaps part of the service, or being used on some festival of the heathen. This I consider as the best reason for the prohibi- tion."[9] The Rashbam as well, explains the passage "Ye shall not eat with the blood; neither shall Ye practice divination nor soothsaying" (Leviticus 19; 2 6)[10]- "It is the prohibition of a heathenish practice connected with witchcraft pagan custom to eat at the grave of a murdered person to avoid his vengeance."[11] The Bible's stories express the said objective no less than its precepts. Moses descends from Mount Sinai holding a supreme document - "And the tables were the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God, graven upon the tables."[12]What does Moses do with the writing of God which he holds? - "And he cast the tables out of his hands, and broke them beneath the mount."[13] If they had made the calf their idol, they would certainly do so with the tables which were the work of God! "And he broke them" - there is no object in the world that deserves to be worshipped and any object in the world that becomes an accessory for idolatry deserves being broken and "ground... to powder."[14]
Neither is man of supreme importance, and when he is immersed in idolatry the law sentences him to death. When Moses sees that the people are "broken loose"[15]bowing and making sacrifices to calf and mask - he cries "Whoso is on the Lord's side, let him come unto me!"[16] Being loyal to the Lord and waging war against idolatry are one and the same. What, then, does he say to the Levites that gathered around him? - "Thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel: Put Ye every man his sword upon his thigh, and go to and fro from gate to gate throughout the camp, and slay every man his brother, and every man his neighbour."[17]Life, brotherhood, friendship, kinship - all are insignificant when they clash with the obligation to fight idolatry.
The liberation of Israel from Egypt's yoke is also not a complete picture of what the exodus from Egypt was about. The struggle between Moses and Pharaoh is not a political struggle but a religious one. 'Moses doesn't bid Pharaoh "Let my people go" - the quotation has been distorted. The passage reads: "Thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel: Let My people go that they may hold a feast unto Me in the wilderness"[18] (Exodus 5; 1 etc.), and what is Pharaoh's answer? - he doesn't speak of the Egyptian economy which is in need of cheap manpower, or of Egyptian history which made him a ruler of men - "Who is the Lord that I should hearken unto his voice to let Israel go?" he asks, "I know not the Lord and moreover I will not let Israel go."[19]Also, when he surrenders after the plague of the first born, he tells Moses and Aaron, "Rise up, get you forth from among my people, both ye and the children of Israel, and go serve the Lord as ye have said." (Exodus, 12; 31).[20] National liberty is not an ultimate objective but a crucial means for organizing the war against idolatry. "What is (the meaning of) Mount Sinai? The mountain whereon there descended hostility (sin'ah) toward idolaters... and why was it called Mount Horeb? Because desolation (hurbah) to idolaters descended thereon." (Shabbath 89).[21]If this is indeed the ideological objective of the precepts and the biblical stories, how is it that such a large portion of the precepts (and several stories as well) seem to have a moral basis? Of the ten commandments, seven deal with what occurs between people and at least five, possibly with slight ammendments, appear in every acceptable theory of ethics. What, then, does the issue of war against idolatry have to do with all this?
An answer to this question can be given only if a distinction is made between religious strategy and religious tactics. The ultimate objective is not the preservation of human life, the prohibition of murder does not, therefore, serve the strategic force directly; preserving the insti- tution of family is also not of supreme importance, the obligations to respect one's parents and not to commit adultery do not, therefore, bear directly upon the strategy. The same relationship exists between the institution of private property and the religious commandment not to steal and between the institution of just legal controversy and the reli- gious commandment not to give false evidence about one's neighbour. However, under the historical circumstances of the Bible, the war against idolatry was a collective task, it was imperative to organize the community of warrior s efficiently and the re is no doubt that the systems of laws allowing human communities to emerge from "the state of nature" (in which war is waged by all against all according to Hobbes' description of it in Leviathan) include central elements, necessary for the existence of any collective as a political entity.
The Bible possesses moral tactics which are necessary for the organization of warriors fighting idolatry, as a community. Even if we assume that the religious collective is a necessary agent for such a war under all possible circumstances, at all times and in all places, even then the moral precepts will not depart the realm of the religious tactics which form the basis for the strategic religious moves as well. The contradiction between the ethical institution and the religious institution cannot be bridged, but that is no reason to conclude that these institutions cannot have similar practical laws. The actions may be the same, but each of these institutions will associate a different meaning with these actions, evaluate them in the light of its ultimate objectives; it is the objectives themselves which are incompatible with each other.
This distinction between strategic and tactical aims is not limited to the realm of the moral precepts. The army for the war against idolatry was organized under specific historical conditions - upon and against a specific cultural background, on a limited social basis and to a certain extent against it. The religious tactics dictated the attitudes towards the given culture and the given society. Therefore it is my opinion that the precepts regarding the institution of slavery, the statutes which distinguish between the rights and duties of men and those of women, the rules of kingship and other similar laws, all express the tactical subordination of the cultural, social and historical conditions to the strategic aims of the battle against all possible manifestations of worship of something that is in the world. If the Jewish nation were founded today, with the aim of obliterating all varieties of idols, wild and meek, outdated and modern, apparent and concealed - wise tactical use of the current conditions of Western society and culture would presumably be made.
One currently relevant conclusion of this view that I will cite here, is a conclusion which Leibowitz taught and made public. Thirty three years ago he wrote, "Very slowly the Jews (of the diaspora) became accustomed to see the law as a thing which has no demands or claims other than those upon personal life. Everything outside of this limited sphere - is a thing upon which the law leaves no impression; moreover, the order of the law does not apply to these things just as it doesn't apply to the weather. Thus, the feeling spread and seeped deep into the unconscious, that national life, social life, problems of science and technology, the economic and political regime - are among the things about which the law determines nothing" (Judaism, a Jewish People and the State of Israel, p. 42). To express this in our terms - the congregation of believers struggled to fight off difficult types of idolatry. A special effort was made to remove all normative status from nature; you have no better example of this than the forest of definitions, conditions and obstacles imposed upon relationships between man and woman so as to combat the possibility of subordination to sexual drives. Yet the same congregation made no serious effort to reach its strategic goals outside of the realms of man himself, man and his neighbour, man and his family, and to a certain extent - man and his congregation.
Leibowitz was not lamenting the revenge of the cursed diaspora, but preaching the overthrow of the diaspora's reign when he spoke of "endeavoring to order public life according to the law." In the same article of 1943 he said, "We must understand that there are, today, duties and problems the solutions of which we will not find arranged and ready in the traditions we have received from our ancestors and our teachers, because they were not compelled to deal with these problems. We cannot be content to walk the way that our forerunners blazed and we will have to search for solutions and invent them despite ourselves." He then adds without going into detail, "There will, in fact, be no real innovation, because all of the solutions are concealed in the law (Torah), but they must be elicited from it." (p. 45, italics in the original). How will we elicit the solutions from it? - It is possible, no doubt, to employ all of the well known techniques used for religious rulings, but that will not be enough; opening a screw-off bottle cap can be likened to creating a vessel and closing an electric circuit can even be likened to striking with a hammer, but the categories for organization of political life differ from those relating to personal and family life. What should be elicited from them is the strategy of war against all idols; what should be ordained? - The ordinations whose observance is equal to the oppression of anything in the political realm that is worshipped by people, such as economic might and military power. I'm not saying that these will never be necessary for tactical purposes, but we must fight the worship of money, the worship of arms, and all of the disgraceful manifestations of tree and stone worship commnited by various breachers of trust.

C.
I have offered a possible stance regarding the function filled by the system comprised of the law and the precepts, but an important layer of the defense for this stance is still missing. The question must be asked - if we are at war with a specific enemy, why don't we choose the means which seems to us to be the most efficient - under the circurnstances of time and place - for our attempt to overpower it? Why not decide afresh, in the present, how to realize our diametrical opposition to the idea that work constitutes regarding the Sabbath?

The answer is a cornpex one. First we must distinguish between the different contexts in which such a question is apt to arise. If it is the wish of someone who is not a Jew to wage total war against any possible manifestation of worship of something in the world, I won't be prepared to tell him that the way of Judaism is the only or even the best way to do this. Maimonides wrote to Rabbi Ovadiah, the convert, on the subject of Moslems, "These sons of Ishmael are not performing idolatry at all. It has long been excised from their mouths and hearts. They allot to the Lord, blessed be He, the appropriate uniqueness, unblemished unique- ness... Their error lies in other things... "Yet if the same question comes from a Jew or from someone interested in Judaism, contemplating the various means of attaining the strategic aims of Judaism, two points must be added.

First of all, tactical considerations are not foreign to Judaism. Leibowitz illustrated this using the political differences between the prophet Isaiah and the prophet Jeremiah. "In Isaiah's generation the nation adhered to the widespread, idolaters' view that the God of Israel was one of the territorial-national gods... In opposition to this Isaiah presents the great principle that all national gods are idols and the God of Israel alone is God. This makes it necessary to associate Jerusalem as the city of God with a special meaning distinguishing it from all other cities... Jeremiah was compelled to turn the religious battle in the opposite direction... (against) belief in the immanent holiness of Jerusalem... and confidence in the magical immunity ensured by this status, disregarding preservation of the law and observation of the precepts. Therefore Jeremiah had to stress that there existed no immanent holiness and consequently no special immunity either... (;) When the people violated God's Torah... Jerusalem's uniqueness was cancelled..." (p. 309) Futhermore, Leibowitz himself, who broke countless penpoints writing of the need for "endeavoring to order public life according to the law" writes in 1975, "Today, the independent meaning of shaping the individual's life as part of the collective framework, should be emphasized more': (p. 45).
In the second place - and this is the more important point -Judaism is given to us and we are not its institutors. The system of laws of the Jewish religion is a constitutive system - it defines Judaism along with its institutions - the holy scriptures, the holyland, the Jewish nation. This system of laws institutes these institutions, it does not serve them; they live by virtue of its decree, it is not dependent upon them. Just as your cannot want to play chess without a king, you cannot want to fight all forms of idolatry as a Jew without the law Torah and the precepts, which constitute the definition of the Jewish war against idolatry. Wherever Judaism solved the problem of war against fetishes, the solution became part of its definition.

It has, of course, internal principles for flexible rulings and highly developed applications, which allow development of the components of the constitutive system, without deviating from the system; when an organization alters its code according to a procedure specified in the code itself, it does not become a new organization - it is the same organization, but the details of its code have been altered. It must further be stated that Judaism possesses an immanent strategy, enabling it to attempt to widen the laws' domain to include new svstems, again, without impairing its identity.
The constitutive character of Judaism as an historic religion is the third idea about which I wished to conduct this discussion, along with the negation of constituents and along with the obligation to fight the worship of anything in the world.

I was contemplating the Creation (and have come to the conclusion) that between the upper and the nether waters there is but two or three fingerbreadths, 'he (ben Zoma) answered, "For it is not written here, and the spirit of God blew but hovered, like a bird flying and flapping with its wings, its wings barely touching."[22]

[1]The Babylonian Talmud, Mo'ed Vol. IV, I. Epstein (trans. ), Soncino press (London, 1938), p. 66.

[2]Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, The Book of Knowledge, M. Hyamson (ed. trans.) Boys Town Jerusalem (Jerusalem, 1965), p. 68a.

[3]IsraelKurnah, A Handbook for Proselytes, The Kumah Publishing Co., (Jerusalem, 1971), p. 11.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid. My colleague Dr. Abraham Nuriel has pointed out to me that Mairnonides associated a different meaning with this principle; my translation does not bear directly upon this meaning.

[6]The Baylonian Talmud, ibid., p. 74.

[7]Ibid., Nashim, Vol. IV, p. 199.

[8]Mekilta de Rabbi Ishmael, Vol. II, J.Z. Lauterbach (trans.& ed. Jewish Publication Society of America (Philadelphia, 1949, p.240.

[9]Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, M.Friedlander (trans.), George Routledge & Sons (London, 1919), p. 371.

[10]The Soncino Chumash, A. Cohen (ed.), Soncino Press (London, 1966), pp.7Z7-8.

[11]Also in the Rashbarn's exegesis of Exodus, 20,21 and Deuteronomy 14;1; I would like to thank my brother, Rimon Kasher, for several relevant excerpts.

[12]Ibid., pp. 551-2.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid., p. 553.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., pp. 553-4.

[18]Ibid., p. 341, author's italics.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid., p. 395.

[21]The Babylonian Talmud, Mo'ed, Vol. I, I. Epstein (trans.), Soncino Press (London, 1938), pp. 424-5.

[22]The Midrash, Vol. I., H. Freedman & M. Simon (trans. & ed.), oncino Press (London, 1961), p. 18.