The works of J. Leibowitz are full of philosophical distinctions, historical interpretations and ideological statements. However, in order to understand the system as a whole - its foundations, its structure and its conclusions - it is of great interest to conduct a detailed comparison between Kant's ethics and the things Leibowitz has said. We will then discover the deep similarity between the conception of religion held by Leibowitz and Kant's conception of ethics, as well as the fundamental disparity between them. Various concepts can resemble each other in form, having structures that are parallel to each other. I intend to make the claim that the view of religion held by Leibowitz and the ethics of Kant are analogous - have virtually the same structure. The common structure makes it possible to translate one system into the other by exchanging one's terms with their counterparts in the other, while the structure of the whole system remains unchanged. The possibility of such an exchange of terms between the ethical system and the Jewish religious system, is a highly interesting one. The stand taken by Leibowitz succeeds in alluminating the phenomenon of Judaism or of the Jewish religious institution, in an original light, yet in spite of its originality and its revolutionary nature, this stand is successfully presented by Leibowitz as a consistent and convincing portrayal of Judaism.
Furthermore, using numerous and interesting examples, Leibowitz shows that this view is not altogether foreign to the concepts held by earlier Jewish thinkers.
I will further claim that a direct result of the formal similarity between these two views is the polarity between the Jewish religion as it is presented by Leibowitz, and ethics as presented by Kant, a polarity which makes co-existence of the two impossible, a polarity which compels a person who accepts one of the two systems, to reject the other. The great formal similarity along with the disparity in content which is just as great, cause ethics and religion to supplant each other, term for term and principe for principle.

Finally I shall try to show that it is possible to explicate the work of Leibowitz not only as an attempt to supply an adequate interpretation for Judaism in its historical manifestation, but also as an attempt to prove that the Jewish system of norms attains the basic objectives assigned by Kant to ethics and theology as he conceived of them, more effectively than the ethical normative system and more effectively than Christianity.

I

The first part of my discussion will be an explanation of the differences between two types of ethical theories: deontic ethical theories and teleological ethical theories. The most obvious example of a deontic ethics is the ethics of Kant. In the second part of my discussion I will attempt to show that Leibowitz presented Judaism as a deontic religion, in opposition to teleological presentations of it.

The most general disparity between the two types of ethics is that within a teleological ethics morality, is conceived of as a means of attaining human aims defined as "good" or "inherently valuable"; in this sense moral conduct is a means of attaining these good aims or enlarging the amount of things which are inherently valuable. In contrast, within a deontic ethic, moral conduct is not assigned such a function. Ethical norms and moral conduct do not possess instrumental value but inherent value. An important result of this distinction is the manner in which the deontic view and the teleological view each correlate the two notions which are central to any method of morals - the notion of good[1], as an attribute of situations and things, and the notion of right or duty as an attribute of deeds and actions (moral standards are derivative notions, all originating from these two notions) In a teleological theory good is defined independently of right or duty. The first step taken by any theory of this type is a proposal for the characterization of the things and situations worthy of the title "good". As the very fact that something is good infers the desirability of its existence in the world, it is obvious that man's duty will then promptly be defined by this view as the performance of those actions that will bring about the maximal realization of good. Right is not, then, defined independently. Its definition is derived from the definition of good. Teleological ethical theories may, of course, differ from each other in their defintions of good, and we are indeed acquainted with a wide range of such definitions, beginning with perfectionist definitions like those of philosophers such as Aristotle and Nietzsche, who define "good" as the realization of human excellence, and ending with hedonistic, eudaemonic and utilitarian definitions.
The structure of deontic theories is inverse. Right is defined indendently of good; an act that is right can, for instance, be defined as an act which is such that someone could desire its governing principle to become a general law. In some cases the notion of good in a deontic theory, will be derived from such a notion of right, and in some cases the two will be independent notions[2] . It is possible to describe the difference between a teleological ethics and a deontic ethics in other terms, by saying that according to the first view, the system of ethical norms is a regulative, guiding system, while the system of ethical commands, according to the second view, is a constitutive system. According to John Rawls and John Searle, who have renewed this distinction, a regulative system of laws is intended to govern a realm of action that exists independently of these laws; the system of traffic laws is the example given by Searle. These laws are supposed to govern traffic activity so that it attains its goals in the most efficient way possible; without the laws these activities might have less satisfying results. On the other hand, a constitutive system of laws does not govern an existing activity but de fine s a new realm of activity. The rules of chess, to use Searle's example, do not govern an independently existing game, but define it and create the possibility of playing it. The laws govern the activity called the game of chess. We can say that in a regulative system of laws, the activity logically pre cedes the laws, while in a constitutive system of laws, the laws logically precede the activity. Similarly, in the case of a regulative system of laws, general objectives of the activity precede the laws which are intended to attain them efficiently, while in the case of a constitutive system of laws, the re are no such external objectives, and if internal objoctives exist in such systems, they are necessarily defined by the laws themselves and not given a priori. The things that will be considered internal objectives, then, are those objectives that draw their meanings from the system of laws, and are meaningless without such a system of laws. Clearly then, in the systems of laws belonging to teleological ethical theories, systems that are regulative, the laws possess a hypothetical status. In other words, each law has the following form: "If you intend to attain objective x, then it is advisable to perform action y. " You are under an obligation to act, only relative to your willingness to attain a specific objective. Contrastingly, in a deontic ethical theory, in which the system of laws is, as stated, constitutive, the status of the laws is categorical. They do not depend upon your aims or upon anyone else's aims; on the contrary, they commit you to a specific type of behavior, whether or not you or anyone besides yourself, have any specific aim. In some cases they may even command you to possess a certain aim[3]. The deontic and teleological views differ further in the character of their tests of the extent of man's morality. According to the teleological view the test of morality is an empirical one. In other words, it will check to what extent the change made in the condition of the world, by the actions being tested, has enlarged the amount of good in the world, according to the standars for good supplied in advance by the ethical theory. On the other hand, according to a deontic position, there is no need for a test of morality of this type. The deontic test of morality is the test whether or not the action was performed according to one of the obligatory norms included in the ethical system or drawing authority from the system.

Accordingly, the legislative procedures in these two types of law systems will be different ones. While the legislative procedure in a deontic ethical system will be a formal one, the legislative procedure in a teleological system will be a material one. To be more specific, a formal legislative procedure imposes a priori constraints upon the laws; anything conforming to these constraints will be satisfactory. For example: a formal (though not necessarily moral) procedure for determining the owner of a given piece of property, would be tossing a coin. The parties agree in advance that distribution of the property according to the outcome of the toss will be accepted by them as fair and conclusive. Whether the coin falls on one side or the other, the result will conform to the agreed procedure and therefore be satisfactory. A material procedure, on the other hand, tries to pass laws that will supposedly attain pre-determined goals. Of course, such laws cannot, by virtue of their very nature, ensure the result in advance. Therefore the question whether they have attained their goals or not, must be decided a posteriori on the basis of the results of their execution. For example the rules of evidence intended as a procedure for examining accusations, should reflect the most efficient means for identifying criminals. Yet, clearly, even the most efficient laws will not ensure, whoever is incorporating them, against errors in identification. Thus, not all results attained through the incorporation of these laws will be equally satisfactory.

It is for this reason that the laws of a teleological system rely upon experience alone, and as their value is instrumental, there is no reason to prevent their substitution by other laws, unless they are proved to be the more efficient ones in attainment of the given goals. In a deontic ethical system the laws are not supposed to be efficient as they are not supposed to serve an external objective of any kind. Therefore, any change in which a law is substituded by another law, is a change in the whole system, to be counted as a substitution of one ethical system by another, unless the original system includes alteration laws in strict adherence to which one law is exchanged for another.
The differences I have described so far, between the deontic view and the teleological view do not form a random list. It seems to me that all of them stem from different assumptions about the possibility of presenting a system of goals or ends common to all men. Some of the teleological views assume that people are basically similar to each other, and that, therefore, it is possible to discover goals which are common to all, or situations or things which will be accepted ty all men as good. Some of the teleological views assume the existence of common human goals that can be recognized by anyone possessing the appropriate knowledge and means of perception. Deontic views perceive of man individualistically; it is impossible to present a single end or a single goal which all will acknowledge as good. According to these views, an ethic of system constitutes a system of laws of the type that determines in advance, the possible boundaries of each person's choice of goals, or the possible boundaries for selecting human life-plans. Given these boundaries of choice, one is allowed to select any goal or life-plan within their framework, deemed by one to be desirable.
According to the teleological positions, rational men will recognize good which is supposed to be acceptable to all, through introspection or through correct use of their rationality. The laws of ethics will be instruments for attaining the maximum amount of basic good without entering into considerations of the distribution of good among men. These are vessels of sorts - containers - within which inherently valuable experiences occur. It does not matter who has such an experience or how these experiences are dispersed among all human beings; these are merely considerations of time and place, devoid of ethical relevance. All we have to do is concentrate upon these inherently valuable experiences, paying attention only to their total amount within all of these human containers together.

In opposition to this, there is, in the deontic position, no place for measuring the amount of utility so as to enlarge it, nor, accordingly, is man a container for utility of any kind. Man is an a ut on om ou s creature, and in spite of the fact that he possesses drives, needs and emotions, he has been given the wisdom which provides him with an opportunity to choose his goals in a completely free manner. Therefore the ideal of the deontic views is a man capable of taking responsibility, during his lifetime, for his own basic interests, and wishing to fulfill them in a manner which can be reciprocally accepted by his neighbour. As autonomy is a quality characteristic of all human beings (and according to Kant of all rational beings), all of these have the right to be equal before the ethical system.

This autonomy and this responsibility, do not comprise a central ideal in the teleological views, and in cases where liberty is presented as an ideal in such a view, it has a different meaning.

Isaiah Berlin distinguishes between two important meanings of the notion of liberty, a negative meaning and a positive meaning[4]. In his opinion[5]the negative sense is involved in an answer to the question "What is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?", while liberty in the positive sense is involved in an answer to the question : "What or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?" In other words, while liberty in the negative sense is independence from others in realization of goals, liberty in the positive sense is freedom from others and yourself, in deciding upon your plans, when freedom from yourself is freedom from your natural inclinations and from your desires. You are your own master. In Berlin's words, "I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind, I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not of causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them."[6]
While a teleological ethical theory assumes the need for liberty in the negative sense as a necessary condition for attaining good or utility, a deontic theory assumes that the very existence of a system of ethical norms as a system according to which men act, is an expression of the fact that man is free in the positive sense. In other words, ethical conduct is evidence of the triumph of man's autonomous side over his heteronomous side, the triumph of rationality over drives and inclinations.

To conclude this part of my discussion, let's look at the question "Why should I be moral?" When this question is asked in an ethical system of the teleological type, it is legitimate, and its answer will be that moral conduct is the most efficient way to attain the desired goals. This is to say that the fact that you are interested in reaching certain goals, analytically infers that you are also interested in activities which will bring about the realization of these goals. Seeing as morality indicates the manner in which your goals may be reached, you are clearly obliged to be moral.
In contrast, when the question, "Why should I be moral?" is asked within the framework of a deontic system of ethics, it is a meaningless question. This question implies a request to point out the external goals of morality, while - as stated above - there are no such external objectives within the framework of a deontic view. In the words of H.A. Prichard[7], we can say that being moral means fulfilling my obligations and the statement that I am obliged to fulfill my obligations is tautological. Therefore the question, "Why should I be moral?" means "Why am I obliged to fulfill my obligation which is, of course, nonsense.

II

Kant's ethical theory is, as I have said, a prototype of a deontic ethics. Kant's Copernican revolution in the field of practical reason, resides in the fact that his forerunners saw nature as dictating man's ends while he determined that man uses practical reason to decide upon his own end, freely and independently of nature. It is because of this that the notion of duty is the central notion in Kant's ethics. Yet the moral duty obliging one is not imposed by any external agent; neither God, nor nature. Man imposes his moral obligations upon himself of his own free will.
This means that moral duty is a result of man's own rational legislation and not of that of any agent other than himself. This duty is not only man's duty, but the duty of any creature belonging to the category of rational being. Yet as man has been given not only wisdom but drives as well, when he endeavors to determine his duty, he is involved in a constant conflict between obedience to his wisdom and obedience to his nature. Therefore there is a perpetual gap, according to Kant, between man's moral competence and his moral performance. While the notion of "duty" belongs to the domain of moral competence, the notion of "good will" belongs to the domain of moral performance. Duty or moral competence, forms the surn of moral obligations, as they are dictated to man by his rationality, while "good will" is the agent that is limited by "subjective restrictions."

We have, then, to develop the concept of a will which is to be esteemed as good of itself without regard to anything else. It dwells already in the natural sound understanding and does not need so much to be taught as only to be brought to light. In the estimation of the total worth of our actions it always takes place first and is the condition of every-thing else. In order to show this, we shall take the concept of duty. It contains that of good will, though with certain subjective restrictions and hindrances; but these are far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable, for they rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the brighter."[8]

Kant presents three principles for the clarification of the concept of duty. The first principle stipulates that an act, in order to be morally right, must have a reason that is not part of one's personal inclinations and interests. The second principle stipulates that the moral value of an honest act follows from the fact that it is not a means for the -at- tainment of any goals; as the act is not dependent upon prior goals its value stems from the rule according to which it was performed. The third principle describes duty as action from a recognition of respect for the law. "But that which is connected with my will merely as a ground, " says Kant, "and not as a consequence, that which does not serve my inclination but overpowers it or at least excludes it from being considered in making a choice - in a word, law itself - can be an object of respect and thus a command. "[9]

Because Kant's ethics is deontic, and its legislative procedure is, as stated, a formal one, Kant's procedure imposes the following constraints upon those rules of behavior intended as moral rules - that they be universal, public, and finite.

I will attempt to give a brief explanation of these restraints Universality.
The demand for universality has three aspects, between which Kant made no explicit distinction. Each aspect indicates a specific point attributed to generality. Although no such explicit distinction exists in Kant's work, Kant makes use of all three types of generality. The absence of this distinction in Kant's work is why he did not notice that a law can be general in one sense without being general in another. The three different possibilities for being universal are: logical universality, practical universality, i. e. universal applicability of the law, and universal acceptance of the law.
Logical universality possessed by a law, means that it is general in the sense that it obliges any man having specific characteristics to perform a specific act; anything obliging a single person, will oblige any person having similar relevant characteristics. This is so because there must be a system of specific characteristics belonging to the action in question, making it an action which has to be performed under certain conditions. Therefore we contradict ourselves if we claim that action X is the duty of some specific person A, under conditions C, while someone else whose relevant features are similar to A and who is now under conditions C, is not obliged to do X.

Universal applicability of a law means that a certain action must be of such a type that it can be equally executed by anyone. This demand formulates the domain to which a moral law applies. In other words, for a law to be moral it must be given to application by any moral person. As Kant himself claims, although it is possible for one person or for several people to make a promise without intending to keep it, it is impossible for everyone to make a promise without intending to keep it, because that would result in concellation of the institution of promising. The demand for universal applicability is a formal demand in relation to moral law in that it permits any action as a moral action, provided that universal conduct according to this type of action is possible.
Universal acceptance of a law means the universal agreement of all rational beings to accept a certain law as mandatory. By this Kant means that every rational being whose actions are determined by rational understanding, must be able to want to accept moral law, consciously and freely, as obligatory for himself and for every other rational being. This demand is expressed explicitly in the first presen- tation of the categorical imperative - "We should act according to no other maxim than that which can also have itself as a universal law for its object."[10]However, other presentations of the categorical imperative and the examples cited by Kant for clarification of the various versions of this imperative, imply the other two demands for universality as well.
Publicity: The demand to be public, does not appear explicitly in Kant's ethics, although it is the implicit basis for the doctrine of the categorical imperative, in that this doctrine demands a moral law to be such that a rational being will be able to want to behave by it in a kingdom of ends.[11]

Public existence ensures that all of the creatures in this kingdom will have knowledge of the laws which oblige them as citizens of the kingdom, virtually as if these laws were the result of an agreement. In "Perpetual Peace"[12]explicit mention of the demand for public existence is made. Elsewhere[13]Kant points out in a footnote:
"No right in a state can be kept under cover by a secret mental reservation, least of all the right . . . which the people claim as belonging to the constitution, because all laws derived from it must be considered to have sprung from a public will. Therefore the constitu- tion would, if it permitted revolution, have to declare this right publicly as well as the procedure by which to make use of it." Finality: This is the demand made upon moral law to be the supreme law. Moral considerations must stand above other possible considerations, such as personal benefit, national benefit and their likes. In Rawls' words we can say that moral laws should be a kind of supreme court of appeals. This last demand is also not mentioned explicitly in Kant's work, but is implied by the whole of Kant's discussion of ethics. It seems to me that the first paragraph of the first chapter in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals implies this demand most clearly. "Nothing in the world - indeed nothing even beyong the world - can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will.[14]As good will is the acceptance of moral law as a guide for behavior, moral considerations are evidently the supreme considerations.

III

I will now go on to a comparison of Kant's deontic ethics to the concept of the Jewish religion held by Leibowitz. I shall state rightout that the great formal similarity between these two views, sterns from the fact that Leibowitz has presented in his concept, a deontic theory of the Jewish religion.

I shall attempt to cite central points in the position held by Leibowitz which will parallel the basic differences, mentioned above, between deontic ethics and teleological ethics. All of the passages quoted from Judaism, a Jewish People and the State of Israel,[15]by Leibowitz, will emphasize the said formal similarity.
A. Leibowitz makes an explicit distinction between two types of religiosity, and there is no doubt that this distinction precisely parallels the one between a deontic view of ethics and a teleological view of ethics.

He writes, "We can distinguish between two types of religiosity: religion which is based upon values and beliefs that necessarily require actions as well, and religion which is based upon precepts and acts whose existence forms grounds for cognitive values and contents as well. A religion of values and beliefs is a provident religion. It is a means through which man fulfills his spiritual needs and eases his spiritual uncertainties; its end is man and God offers assistance to man within its framework; whosoever embraces this religion is saved. "A religion of commands" is a demanding religion. It imposes obligations and duties upon man and turns him into an instrument for the attainment of an end, the embodiment of which is not man; the only satisfaction is gives is the satisfaction of performing one's duty"[16]According to Leibowitz Christianity is a teleological religion while Judaism is a deontic religion.
Elsewhere Leibowitz says, "Practical precepts as a way of life, as a permanent constant manner of human existence, prevent religion from becoming a means of attaining a goal... Most of these precepts are not efficient and do not serve man in any manner determined by his own needs. A person cannot accept this way of life unless he sees the worship of God as an end and not as a means of attaining any other end"[17]

B. Clearly paralleling the central place occupied by the concept of moral duty in Kant's deontic ethics, the concept of religious duty plays a central role in the deontic view of religion held by Leibowitz : "Jewish law (the halakha)," Leibowitz claims, "addresses man's of duty and not the emotional elements of his soul"[18]and he often cites the well-known passage from the beginning of the Shulkhan Arukh "man should be strong as a lion to direct his heart to the worship of God"[19]

C. In Leibowitz's concept of Judaism, norms of behavior also form a constitutive system, just as Kant's deontic ethics does. The precepts constitute the "institution of Judaism" and they are not intended to realize any external objectives. "We define Judaism, "says Leibowitz, as an institutional religion, not only in the sense of its possessing institutions... but in the sense that these instituions - the practical precepts - themselves, comprise the religion itself in Judaism, and it does not exists at all outside these institutions."[20]The precepts are not intended, then, to regulate a realm of activity which exists independently of them; they institute the realm of the religious activity of Judaism. Therefore - "Even the values of faith within Judaism or its content - the status of man before God - have only one form of expression: the framework of Jewish law. And anyone who imagines that the contents can be preserved and this law altered according to man's needs... is but mistaken. The essence of the faith of Judaism is that its sole expression is the systematic framework of practical precepts (mitzvot) - the law (halakha)."[21]As stated above, it is impossible to change the form of a constitutive system while preserving its contents; such changes amount to exchanging one system for another.

Leibowitz adds another important point regarding this subject - "The Jewish religion, being the world of Jewish law, of the oral Torah, was not created by the holy scriptures, but the holy scriptures are one of the institutions of the Jewish religion. From a religious point of view and from a logical-causal point of view the oral Torah which comprises the world of Jewish law, precedes the written Torah, which comprises the world of belief and values... the law of the oral Torah which is a human creation draws its authority from the living word of God in the Bible but it is what determines the content and the meaning of the scriptures'.'[22]

D. The religious test of the performance of duty runs, in the conception of Leibowitz, parallel to the moral test according to Kant's deontic concept. A person's decision is religious if his intention in making it was deciding "for the sake of heaven"[23]and a decision for the sake of Heaven can, obviously, be only a decision to accept the duty of observing the Torah and the precepts.

E. Just as the imperatives have categorical status in a deontic ethics, the precepts are categorical in a deontic religion. Leibowitz says, "Judaism which does not demand an authority which is independent of needs and interests, Judaism which has lost the self confidence and the spiritual courage to set itself up as an end for the Jew and for the Jewish people, and not as a means of satisfying their needs, such Judaism has ceased to be a factor capable of surviving spiritual, educational and public strife."[24]
F. As the religious system is deontic, according to Leibowitz's view, the laws are derived here too in a formal legislative procedure. Such a procedure imposes a priori constraints at the laws, and therefore such constraints apply to the religious laws as well. There three constraints found in Kant's ethics, namely: universality, publicity and finality, also appear in Leibowitz's work, though as Judaism doesn't comprise a system of norms applying to all rational beings, but a system of norms applying only to all Jews, the range of application of the precepts of Judaism will be narrower than the range to which moral imperatives apply, Universality: Parallel to the demand for universality appearing in Kant's work, such a demand appears in the work of Leibowitz. Leibowitz, too, suggests the existence of several possibilities of generality. Analogously to logical universality as a formal constraint upon moral laws, Leibowitz says of the precepts, "Any religious demand or direction, whether a commandment or a prohibition, is intended for execution by all Jews. No obligation or prohibition applies to me if, by virtue of its essence, it does not apply to some other Jew."[25]In other words - whatever obliges one Jew also obliges anyone who is similar to him in the respects relevant to Judaism. This demand is, as stated, similar to the Kantian demand, but the "relevant respects" according to Kant, follow from all of the qualities that can be seen as essential to man, or more precisely, to rational beings, while the "relevant respects" in Leibowitz's work will be the qualities characteristic of a Jew.
A demand for universal applicabitlity also appears in the work of Leibowitz: "When I recognize that a certain command cannot apply to every Jew for reasons that are irnmanent to it, it ceases to apply to myself as well."[26]In other words, the test here involves the capability to act together in accordance with the law. The sequel, therefore, is "We will thus remove the religiously horrifying phenomenon of demanding replacement of religious people by unreligious people in necessary utilities, on the Sabbath. When I acknowledge, religiously, the need to operate a certain utility, there is no basis to demand for myself an exemption that cannot be demanded for every Jew. We have already stated above: There is no religious life-program for religious Jews; there is only a religious life-program for Jews."
Universal acceptance is also demanded within Jewish tradition, but the meaning of this demand is different than that of the Kantian demand. Kant's explanation of the fact that any type of behavior has to be accepted universally, in order to be considered moral behavior, follows from his view of man, or any other rational being, as a supreme value. Therefore, the considerations to be made while deciding upon his conduct, are not considerations regarding the personal interests of a specific person or group of people, but practical considerations, made from a general point of view, a point of view enabling us to express our desire to deal with each man as an end and not only as a means. We can make such judgements from a general point of view "if we abstract from the personal difference of rational beings and thus from all content of their private ends."[27]

On the other hand, Leibowitz's demand for universal acceptance results from a view of this acceptance as an expression of the fact that man, by his very nature, is an autonomous creature, but this autonomy possessed by man, and his ability to determine his own laws, do not make man a supreme value. On the contrary, it is this ability which enables him to recognize his worthlessness and the fact that he is not the supreme value. Leibowitz stresses this difference in the motto, "I have set the Lord always before me."[28]He claims that this passage means "I have not set man always before me."[29]While we can say of Kantian ethics that its motto is "I have set man always before me."

G. Just as the difference between deontic ethics and teleological ethics stems from differing views of man, so, it seems to me, do the differences between a deontic religion and a teleological religion stem from differences in the conception of man. According to Leibowitz's position, man is an autonomous creature, he is capable, in other words, of conforming to laws that contradict his nature. Like Kant, Leibowitz uses the concept of liberty in its positive sense. He says, "What is man's liberty - the acceptance of a way of life that does not follow from man's nature means - man's liberation from his subjugation to the agent of raw nature."[30]

Thus the similarity between the position taken by Leibowitz on Judaism, and the position taken by Kant regarding ethics, is very great indeed, but so is the disparity between them. Just as deep as their formal similarity is their difference in contact and in the way each of the positions understands its specific notions. The crucial point of disparity between the two views seems to me to reside in the fact that Leibowitz, in contrast to Kant, sees morality not as an adversary of human nature but one of its expressions. When man behaves morally he is not behaving autonomously at all, but in accordance with his nature. The antithesis of behavior according to the nature imposed upon man is morality, according to Kant, while according to Leibowitz it is composed of artificial rules, foreign to man's needs. He says, "From a religious point of view there is no place for the trichotomy - nature-spirit-God; there is only a dichotomy in reality: nature which inclues man's spirit as well, and God. There is only one way for man to deviate from the framework of subjugation to nature's forces - adherence to God, the tangible meaning of which is executing God's will and not man' s will... Therefore there is no liberation from the bonds of nature except in the acceptance of servitude to the Torah and the precepts, a servitude which does not follow from nature."[31]He also says, "Liberation from the bonds of subjugation to nature is affected only by a religion of precepts, and conquest of one's drives for secular moral or ideological reasons, cannot affect such liberation." The antithesis of the natural is not, then, the spiritual, but the artificial, in the laws of Sabbath, for instance, of which Leibowitz says, "The whole strength of the Sabbath lies in the fact that it is foreign to the natural way of life."[32]

This seems to me to be a problematic point. It is by no means clear why moral conduct is conduct according to nature, while religious conduct is not. If conduct according to nature is defined as conduct without which human life is impossible, there is no doubt that moral conduct is something else, and man's long history is evidence of this. If, on the other hand, conduct according to nature is such that man can adopt it for himself during his lifetime, even if this be done imperfectly (and here again there is no difference between moral behavior and religious behavior: just as a religious person must daily overcome his nature, a moral person too must constantly overcome his inclinations), then religious conduct is no different in this sense from moral conduct. Moral conduct, exactly like religious conduct, has at least to be natural in the sense of its being performable for human beings, even if its performance is imperfect, because otherwise the precepts of religion and the imperatives of morality would be void commands, commands the execution of which is impossible, for from each meaningful "must", a "can" must follow, even if only a partial "can".

This is the place to note that a deontic religion, as well, has no place for the question: "Why should I be obliged by the obligations of religiosity?", just as in a deontic ethics the question, "Why should I be moral?" was meaningless. Obedience to the constitutive system of religious laws is the supreme end and any request for reasons conceives of it as a means to something outside itself and not as such an end. The question "What for?" cannot be applied to supreme ends.

Here, then, is the great similarity, and here is the abysmal difference. As both the deontic ethics and the deontic religion demand the status of "supreme court of appeals", it is imperative to decide one way or the other. A great deal of courage is needed in order to present the unbridgeable gap between ethics and Judaism. The price of becoming convinced of the existence of such a gap, and therefore of the need to decide, absolutely, between the alternative of being a religious Jew and that of being a moral person, is indeed extremely high, too high.

[1]The term good is usually used ambiguously, we will find the quality "good" attributed both to actions and to aims or situations. It seems to me that in order to avoid possible misunderstandings, a distinction should'be made between "good" which describes aims or situations, and "'honest" which describes actions.

[2]For example in an ethical theory of the type held by D. Ross.

[3]For example, when you are operating within a specific realm of activity, in which internal objectives are defined, the laws command you to try to attain these objectives. When you are playing soccer the rules of the game determine that you should attempt to reach the higher score.

[4]In his article, "Two Concepts of Liberty", in his book, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press (Londen, 1969).

[5]Ibid. pp. 121-2.

[6]Ibid., p. 131.

[7]H.A. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?", in Moral Obligation : Essays and Lectures, Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1949), pp. 1-17.

[8]Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, L. W. Beck (trans. Bobbs-Merrill (New York, 1959), p. l3

[9]Ibid., p. 17.

[10]Ibid., p. 65.

[11]J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass. , 1971), p. 133.

[12]Political Writings, H. Reiss (ed. ), Cambridge University Press (1970), pp. 125-130 (Appendix II).

[13]"Theory and Practice", in: The Philosophy of Kant, C. J. Friedrich (ed. ), Random House (New York, 1949), p. 426.

[14]Foundations, ibid., p. 9.

[15](in Hebrew), Schocken, Jerusalem en Tel Aviv, 1975.

[16]Ibid., p. 22.

[17]Ibid. , p. 24.

[18]Ibid.

[19]The Concise Code of Jewish Law, G. Appel, Yeshiva University Press (New York, 1977), p. 31.

[20]Leibowitz, ibid. , p. 14.

[21]Ibid. p. 17.

[22]Ibid. p. 21.

[23]Ibid. p. 294.

[24]ibid. p. 170.

[25]ibid., p. 204.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Foundations, ibid., p. 51.

[28]The Concise Code, ibid.

[29]Judaism, ibid., p.315.

[30]Ibid., p. 29.

[31]Ibid., p. 30.

[32]Ibid., p. 29.