The works of J. Leibowitz are full of philosophical
distinctions, historical interpretations and ideological statements. However, in
order to understand the system as a whole - its foundations, its structure and
its conclusions - it is of great interest to conduct a detailed comparison
between Kant's ethics and the things Leibowitz has said. We will then discover
the deep similarity between the conception of religion held by Leibowitz and
Kant's conception of ethics, as well as the fundamental disparity between them.
Various concepts can resemble each other in form, having structures that are
parallel to each other. I intend to make the claim that the view of religion
held by Leibowitz and the ethics of Kant are analogous - have virtually the same
structure. The common structure makes it possible to translate one system into
the other by exchanging one's terms with their counterparts in the other, while
the structure of the whole system remains unchanged. The possibility of such an
exchange of terms between the ethical system and the Jewish religious system, is
a highly interesting one. The stand taken by Leibowitz succeeds in alluminating
the phenomenon of Judaism or of the Jewish religious institution, in an original
light, yet in spite of its originality and its revolutionary nature, this stand
is successfully presented by Leibowitz as a consistent and convincing portrayal
of Judaism.
Furthermore, using numerous and interesting examples, Leibowitz
shows that this view is not altogether foreign to the concepts held by earlier
Jewish thinkers.
I will further claim that a direct result of the formal
similarity between these two views is the polarity between the Jewish religion
as it is presented by Leibowitz, and ethics as presented by Kant, a polarity
which makes co-existence of the two impossible, a polarity which compels a
person who accepts one of the two systems, to reject the other. The great formal
similarity along with the disparity in content which is just as great, cause
ethics and religion to supplant each other, term for term and principe for
principle.
Finally I shall try to show that it is possible to
explicate the work of Leibowitz not only as an attempt to supply an adequate
interpretation for Judaism in its historical manifestation, but also as an
attempt to prove that the Jewish system of norms attains the basic objectives
assigned by Kant to ethics and theology as he conceived of them, more
effectively than the ethical normative system and more effectively than
Christianity.
I
The first part of my discussion will be an explanation
of the differences between two types of ethical theories: deontic ethical
theories and teleological ethical theories. The most obvious example of a
deontic ethics is the ethics of Kant. In the second part of my discussion I will
attempt to show that Leibowitz presented Judaism as a deontic religion, in
opposition to teleological presentations of it.
The most general disparity between the two types of
ethics is that within a teleological ethics morality, is conceived of as a means
of attaining human aims defined as "good" or "inherently valuable"; in this
sense moral conduct is a means of attaining these good aims or enlarging the
amount of things which are inherently valuable. In contrast, within a deontic
ethic, moral conduct is not assigned such a function. Ethical norms and moral
conduct do not possess instrumental value but inherent value. An
important result of this distinction is the manner in which the deontic view and
the teleological view each correlate the two notions which are central to any
method of morals - the notion of good[1],
as an attribute of situations and things, and the notion of right or
duty as an attribute of deeds and actions (moral standards are derivative
notions, all originating from these two notions) In a teleological theory good
is defined independently of right or duty. The first step taken by any theory of
this type is a proposal for the characterization of the things and situations
worthy of the title "good". As the very fact that something is good infers the
desirability of its existence in the world, it is obvious that man's duty will
then promptly be defined by this view as the performance of those actions that
will bring about the maximal realization of good. Right is not, then, defined
independently. Its definition is derived from the definition of good.
Teleological ethical theories may, of course, differ from each other in their
defintions of good, and we are indeed acquainted with a wide range of such
definitions, beginning with perfectionist definitions like those of philosophers
such as Aristotle and Nietzsche, who define "good" as the realization of human
excellence, and ending with hedonistic, eudaemonic and utilitarian definitions.
The structure of deontic theories is inverse. Right is defined indendently
of good; an act that is right can, for instance, be defined as an act which is
such that someone could desire its governing principle to become a general law.
In some cases the notion of good in a deontic theory, will be derived from such
a notion of right, and in some cases the two will be independent notions[2]
. It is possible to describe the difference between a teleological ethics and a
deontic ethics in other terms, by saying that according to the first view, the
system of ethical norms is a regulative, guiding system, while the system of
ethical commands, according to the second view, is a constitutive system.
According to John Rawls and John Searle, who have renewed this distinction, a
regulative system of laws is intended to govern a realm of action that exists
independently of these laws; the system of traffic laws is the example given by
Searle. These laws are supposed to govern traffic activity so that it attains
its goals in the most efficient way possible; without the laws these activities
might have less satisfying results. On the other hand, a constitutive system of
laws does not govern an existing activity but de fine s a new realm of activity.
The rules of chess, to use Searle's example, do not govern an independently
existing game, but define it and create the possibility of playing it. The laws
govern the activity called the game of chess. We can say that in a regulative
system of laws, the activity logically pre cedes the laws, while in a
constitutive system of laws, the laws logically precede the activity. Similarly,
in the case of a regulative system of laws, general objectives of the activity
precede the laws which are intended to attain them efficiently, while in the
case of a constitutive system of laws, the re are no such external
objectives, and if internal objoctives exist in such systems, they
are necessarily defined by the laws themselves and not given a priori. The
things that will be considered internal objectives, then, are those objectives
that draw their meanings from the system of laws, and are meaningless without
such a system of laws. Clearly then, in the systems of laws belonging to
teleological ethical theories, systems that are regulative, the laws possess a
hypothetical status. In other words, each law has the following form: "If you
intend to attain objective x, then it is advisable to perform action y. " You
are under an obligation to act, only relative to your willingness to attain a
specific objective. Contrastingly, in a deontic ethical theory, in which the
system of laws is, as stated, constitutive, the status of the laws is
categorical. They do not depend upon your aims or upon anyone else's aims; on
the contrary, they commit you to a specific type of behavior, whether or not you
or anyone besides yourself, have any specific aim. In some cases they may even
command you to possess a certain aim[3].
The deontic and teleological views differ further in the character of their
tests of the extent of man's morality. According to the teleological view the
test of morality is an empirical one. In other words, it will check to what
extent the change made in the condition of the world, by the actions being
tested, has enlarged the amount of good in the world, according to the standars
for good supplied in advance by the ethical theory. On the other hand, according
to a deontic position, there is no need for a test of morality of this type. The
deontic test of morality is the test whether or not the action was performed
according to one of the obligatory norms included in the ethical system or
drawing authority from the system.
Accordingly, the legislative procedures in these two
types of law systems will be different ones. While the legislative procedure in
a deontic ethical system will be a formal one, the legislative procedure in a
teleological system will be a material one. To be more specific, a formal
legislative procedure imposes a priori constraints upon the laws; anything
conforming to these constraints will be satisfactory. For example: a formal
(though not necessarily moral) procedure for determining the owner of a given
piece of property, would be tossing a coin. The parties agree in advance that
distribution of the property according to the outcome of the toss will be
accepted by them as fair and conclusive. Whether the coin falls on one side or
the other, the result will conform to the agreed procedure and therefore be
satisfactory. A material procedure, on the other hand, tries to pass laws that
will supposedly attain pre-determined goals. Of course, such laws cannot, by
virtue of their very nature, ensure the result in advance. Therefore the
question whether they have attained their goals or not, must be decided a
posteriori on the basis of the results of their execution. For example the rules
of evidence intended as a procedure for examining accusations, should reflect
the most efficient means for identifying criminals. Yet, clearly, even the most
efficient laws will not ensure, whoever is incorporating them, against errors in
identification. Thus, not all results attained through the incorporation of
these laws will be equally satisfactory.
It is for this reason that the laws of a teleological
system rely upon experience alone, and as their value is instrumental, there is
no reason to prevent their substitution by other laws, unless they are proved to
be the more efficient ones in attainment of the given goals. In a deontic
ethical system the laws are not supposed to be efficient as they are not
supposed to serve an external objective of any kind. Therefore, any change in
which a law is substituded by another law, is a change in the whole system, to
be counted as a substitution of one ethical system by another, unless the
original system includes alteration laws in strict adherence to which one law is
exchanged for another.
The differences I have described so far, between the
deontic view and the teleological view do not form a random list. It seems to me
that all of them stem from different assumptions about the possibility of
presenting a system of goals or ends common to all men. Some of the teleological
views assume that people are basically similar to each other, and that,
therefore, it is possible to discover goals which are common to all, or
situations or things which will be accepted ty all men as good. Some of the
teleological views assume the existence of common human goals that can be
recognized by anyone possessing the appropriate knowledge and means of
perception. Deontic views perceive of man individualistically; it is impossible
to present a single end or a single goal which all will acknowledge as good.
According to these views, an ethic of system constitutes a system of laws of the
type that determines in advance, the possible boundaries of each person's choice
of goals, or the possible boundaries for selecting human life-plans. Given these
boundaries of choice, one is allowed to select any goal or life-plan within
their framework, deemed by one to be desirable.
According to the
teleological positions, rational men will recognize good which is supposed to be
acceptable to all, through introspection or through correct use of their
rationality. The laws of ethics will be instruments for attaining the maximum
amount of basic good without entering into considerations of the distribution of
good among men. These are vessels of sorts - containers - within which
inherently valuable experiences occur. It does not matter who has such an
experience or how these experiences are dispersed among all human beings; these
are merely considerations of time and place, devoid of ethical relevance. All we
have to do is concentrate upon these inherently valuable experiences, paying
attention only to their total amount within all of these human containers
together.
In opposition to this, there is, in the deontic
position, no place for measuring the amount of utility so as to enlarge it, nor,
accordingly, is man a container for utility of any kind. Man is an a ut on om ou
s creature, and in spite of the fact that he possesses drives, needs and
emotions, he has been given the wisdom which provides him with an opportunity to
choose his goals in a completely free manner. Therefore the ideal of the deontic
views is a man capable of taking responsibility, during his lifetime, for his
own basic interests, and wishing to fulfill them in a manner which can be
reciprocally accepted by his neighbour. As autonomy is a quality characteristic
of all human beings (and according to Kant of all rational beings), all of these
have the right to be equal before the ethical system.
This autonomy and this responsibility, do not comprise
a central ideal in the teleological views, and in cases where liberty is
presented as an ideal in such a view, it has a different meaning.
Isaiah Berlin distinguishes between two important
meanings of the notion of liberty, a negative meaning and a positive meaning[4].
In his opinion[5]the
negative sense is involved in an answer to the question "What is the area within
which the subject - a person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or
be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?", while
liberty in the positive sense is involved in an answer to the question : "What
or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to
do, or be, this rather than that?" In other words, while liberty in the negative
sense is independence from others in realization of goals, liberty in the
positive sense is freedom from others and yourself, in deciding upon your plans,
when freedom from yourself is freedom from your natural inclinations and from
your desires. You are your own master. In Berlin's words, "I wish my life and
decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind, I wish
to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a
subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are
my own, not of causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be
somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed
not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an
animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is of conceiving
goals and policies of my own and realizing them."[6]
While a teleological ethical theory assumes the need for liberty in the
negative sense as a necessary condition for attaining good or utility, a deontic
theory assumes that the very existence of a system of ethical norms as a system
according to which men act, is an expression of the fact that man is free in the
positive sense. In other words, ethical conduct is evidence of the triumph of
man's autonomous side over his heteronomous side, the triumph of rationality
over drives and inclinations.
To conclude this part of my discussion, let's look at
the question "Why should I be moral?" When this question is asked in an ethical
system of the teleological type, it is legitimate, and its answer will be that
moral conduct is the most efficient way to attain the desired goals. This is to
say that the fact that you are interested in reaching certain goals,
analytically infers that you are also interested in activities which will bring
about the realization of these goals. Seeing as morality indicates the manner in
which your goals may be reached, you are clearly obliged to be moral.
In
contrast, when the question, "Why should I be moral?" is asked within the
framework of a deontic system of ethics, it is a meaningless question. This
question implies a request to point out the external goals of morality, while -
as stated above - there are no such external objectives within the framework of
a deontic view. In the words of H.A. Prichard[7],
we can say that being moral means fulfilling my obligations and the statement
that I am obliged to fulfill my obligations is tautological. Therefore the
question, "Why should I be moral?" means "Why am I obliged to fulfill my
obligation which is, of course, nonsense.
II
Kant's ethical theory is, as I have said, a prototype
of a deontic ethics. Kant's Copernican revolution in the field of practical
reason, resides in the fact that his forerunners saw nature as dictating man's
ends while he determined that man uses practical reason to decide upon his own
end, freely and independently of nature. It is because of this that the notion
of duty is the central notion in Kant's ethics. Yet the moral duty obliging one
is not imposed by any external agent; neither God, nor nature. Man imposes his
moral obligations upon himself of his own free will.
This means that moral
duty is a result of man's own rational legislation and not of that of any agent
other than himself. This duty is not only man's duty, but the duty of any
creature belonging to the category of rational being. Yet as man has been given
not only wisdom but drives as well, when he endeavors to determine his duty, he
is involved in a constant conflict between obedience to his wisdom and obedience
to his nature. Therefore there is a perpetual gap, according to Kant, between
man's moral competence and his moral performance. While the notion of "duty"
belongs to the domain of moral competence, the notion of "good will" belongs to
the domain of moral performance. Duty or moral competence, forms the surn of
moral obligations, as they are dictated to man by his rationality, while "good
will" is the agent that is limited by "subjective restrictions."
We have, then, to develop the concept of a will which
is to be esteemed as good of itself without regard to anything else. It dwells
already in the natural sound understanding and does not need so much to be
taught as only to be brought to light. In the estimation of the total worth of
our actions it always takes place first and is the condition of every-thing
else. In order to show this, we shall take the concept of duty. It contains that
of good will, though with certain subjective restrictions and hindrances; but
these are far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable, for they rather
bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the brighter."[8]
Kant presents three principles for the clarification of
the concept of duty. The first principle stipulates that an act, in order to be
morally right, must have a reason that is not part of one's personal
inclinations and interests. The second principle stipulates that the moral value
of an honest act follows from the fact that it is not a means for the -at-
tainment of any goals; as the act is not dependent upon prior goals its value
stems from the rule according to which it was performed. The third principle
describes duty as action from a recognition of respect for the law. "But that
which is connected with my will merely as a ground, " says Kant, "and not as a
consequence, that which does not serve my inclination but overpowers it or at
least excludes it from being considered in making a choice - in a word, law
itself - can be an object of respect and thus a command. "[9]
Because Kant's ethics is deontic, and its legislative
procedure is, as stated, a formal one, Kant's procedure imposes the following
constraints upon those rules of behavior intended as moral rules - that they be
universal, public, and finite.
I will attempt to give a brief explanation of these
restraints Universality.
The demand for universality has three aspects,
between which Kant made no explicit distinction. Each aspect indicates a
specific point attributed to generality. Although no such explicit distinction
exists in Kant's work, Kant makes use of all three types of generality. The
absence of this distinction in Kant's work is why he did not notice that a law
can be general in one sense without being general in another. The three
different possibilities for being universal are: logical universality, practical
universality, i. e. universal applicability of the law, and universal acceptance
of the law.
Logical universality possessed by a law, means that it is
general in the sense that it obliges any man having specific characteristics to
perform a specific act; anything obliging a single person, will oblige any
person having similar relevant characteristics. This is so because there must be
a system of specific characteristics belonging to the action in question, making
it an action which has to be performed under certain conditions. Therefore we
contradict ourselves if we claim that action X is the duty of some specific
person A, under conditions C, while someone else whose relevant features are
similar to A and who is now under conditions C, is not obliged to do X.
Universal applicability of a law means that a
certain action must be of such a type that it can be equally executed by anyone.
This demand formulates the domain to which a moral law applies. In other words,
for a law to be moral it must be given to application by any moral person. As
Kant himself claims, although it is possible for one person or for several
people to make a promise without intending to keep it, it is impossible for
everyone to make a promise without intending to keep it, because that would
result in concellation of the institution of promising. The demand for universal
applicability is a formal demand in relation to moral law in that it permits any
action as a moral action, provided that universal conduct according to this type
of action is possible.
Universal acceptance of a law means the
universal agreement of all rational beings to accept a certain law as mandatory.
By this Kant means that every rational being whose actions are determined by
rational understanding, must be able to want to accept moral law, consciously
and freely, as obligatory for himself and for every other rational being. This
demand is expressed explicitly in the first presen- tation of the categorical
imperative - "We should act according to no other maxim than that which can also
have itself as a universal law for its object."[10]However,
other presentations of the categorical imperative and the examples cited by Kant
for clarification of the various versions of this imperative, imply the other
two demands for universality as well.
Publicity: The demand to be public,
does not appear explicitly in Kant's ethics, although it is the implicit basis
for the doctrine of the categorical imperative, in that this doctrine demands a
moral law to be such that a rational being will be able to want to behave by it
in a kingdom of ends.[11]
Public existence ensures that all of the creatures in
this kingdom will have knowledge of the laws which oblige them as citizens of
the kingdom, virtually as if these laws were the result of an agreement. In
"Perpetual Peace"[12]explicit
mention of the demand for public existence is made. Elsewhere[13]Kant
points out in a footnote:
"No right in a state can be kept under cover by a
secret mental reservation, least of all the right . . . which the people claim
as belonging to the constitution, because all laws derived from it must be
considered to have sprung from a public will. Therefore the constitu- tion
would, if it permitted revolution, have to declare this right publicly as well
as the procedure by which to make use of it." Finality: This is the
demand made upon moral law to be the supreme law. Moral considerations must
stand above other possible considerations, such as personal benefit, national
benefit and their likes. In Rawls' words we can say that moral laws should be a
kind of supreme court of appeals. This last demand is also not mentioned
explicitly in Kant's work, but is implied by the whole of Kant's discussion of
ethics. It seems to me that the first paragraph of the first chapter in
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals implies this demand most clearly.
"Nothing in the world - indeed nothing even beyong the world - can possibly be
conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will.[14]As
good will is the acceptance of moral law as a guide for behavior, moral
considerations are evidently the supreme considerations.
III
I will now go on to a comparison of Kant's deontic
ethics to the concept of the Jewish religion held by Leibowitz. I shall state
rightout that the great formal similarity between these two views, sterns from
the fact that Leibowitz has presented in his concept, a deontic theory of the
Jewish religion.
I shall attempt to cite central points in the position
held by Leibowitz which will parallel the basic differences, mentioned above,
between deontic ethics and teleological ethics. All of the passages quoted from
Judaism, a Jewish People and the State of Israel,[15]by
Leibowitz, will emphasize the said formal similarity.
A. Leibowitz
makes an explicit distinction between two types of religiosity, and there is no
doubt that this distinction precisely parallels the one between a deontic view
of ethics and a teleological view of ethics.
He writes, "We can distinguish between two types of
religiosity: religion which is based upon values and beliefs that necessarily
require actions as well, and religion which is based upon precepts and acts
whose existence forms grounds for cognitive values and contents as well. A
religion of values and beliefs is a provident religion. It is a means through
which man fulfills his spiritual needs and eases his spiritual uncertainties;
its end is man and God offers assistance to man within its framework; whosoever
embraces this religion is saved. "A religion of commands" is a demanding
religion. It imposes obligations and duties upon man and turns him into an
instrument for the attainment of an end, the embodiment of which is not man; the
only satisfaction is gives is the satisfaction of performing one's duty"[16]According
to Leibowitz Christianity is a teleological religion while Judaism is a deontic
religion.
Elsewhere Leibowitz says, "Practical precepts as a way of life, as
a permanent constant manner of human existence, prevent religion from becoming a
means of attaining a goal... Most of these precepts are not efficient and do not
serve man in any manner determined by his own needs. A person cannot accept this
way of life unless he sees the worship of God as an end and not as a means of
attaining any other end"[17]
B. Clearly paralleling the central place
occupied by the concept of moral duty in Kant's deontic ethics, the concept of
religious duty plays a central role in the deontic view of religion held by
Leibowitz : "Jewish law (the halakha)," Leibowitz claims, "addresses man's of
duty and not the emotional elements of his soul"[18]and
he often cites the well-known passage from the beginning of the Shulkhan Arukh
"man should be strong as a lion to direct his heart to the worship of God"[19]
C. In Leibowitz's concept of Judaism, norms of
behavior also form a constitutive system, just as Kant's deontic ethics does.
The precepts constitute the "institution of Judaism" and they are not intended
to realize any external objectives. "We define Judaism, "says Leibowitz, as an
institutional religion, not only in the sense of its possessing institutions...
but in the sense that these instituions - the practical precepts - themselves,
comprise the religion itself in Judaism, and it does not exists at all outside
these institutions."[20]The
precepts are not intended, then, to regulate a realm of activity which exists
independently of them; they institute the realm of the religious activity of
Judaism. Therefore - "Even the values of faith within Judaism or its content -
the status of man before God - have only one form of expression: the framework
of Jewish law. And anyone who imagines that the contents can be preserved and
this law altered according to man's needs... is but mistaken. The essence of the
faith of Judaism is that its sole expression is the systematic framework of
practical precepts (mitzvot) - the law (halakha)."[21]As
stated above, it is impossible to change the form of a constitutive system while
preserving its contents; such changes amount to exchanging one system for
another.
Leibowitz adds another important point regarding this
subject - "The Jewish religion, being the world of Jewish law, of the oral
Torah, was not created by the holy scriptures, but the holy scriptures are one
of the institutions of the Jewish religion. From a religious point of view and
from a logical-causal point of view the oral Torah which comprises the world of
Jewish law, precedes the written Torah, which comprises the world of belief and
values... the law of the oral Torah which is a human creation draws its
authority from the living word of God in the Bible but it is what determines the
content and the meaning of the scriptures'.'[22]
D. The religious test of the performance of duty
runs, in the conception of Leibowitz, parallel to the moral test according to
Kant's deontic concept. A person's decision is religious if his intention in
making it was deciding "for the sake of heaven"[23]and
a decision for the sake of Heaven can, obviously, be only a decision to accept
the duty of observing the Torah and the precepts.
E. Just as the imperatives have categorical
status in a deontic ethics, the precepts are categorical in a deontic religion.
Leibowitz says, "Judaism which does not demand an authority which is independent
of needs and interests, Judaism which has lost the self confidence and the
spiritual courage to set itself up as an end for the Jew and for the Jewish
people, and not as a means of satisfying their needs, such Judaism has ceased to
be a factor capable of surviving spiritual, educational and public strife."[24]
F. As the religious system is deontic, according to Leibowitz's view,
the laws are derived here too in a formal legislative procedure. Such a
procedure imposes a priori constraints at the laws, and therefore such
constraints apply to the religious laws as well. There three constraints found
in Kant's ethics, namely: universality, publicity and finality, also appear in
Leibowitz's work, though as Judaism doesn't comprise a system of norms applying
to all rational beings, but a system of norms applying only to all Jews, the
range of application of the precepts of Judaism will be narrower than the range
to which moral imperatives apply, Universality: Parallel to the demand
for universality appearing in Kant's work, such a demand appears in the work of
Leibowitz. Leibowitz, too, suggests the existence of several possibilities of
generality. Analogously to logical universality as a formal constraint upon
moral laws, Leibowitz says of the precepts, "Any religious demand or direction,
whether a commandment or a prohibition, is intended for execution by all Jews.
No obligation or prohibition applies to me if, by virtue of its essence, it does
not apply to some other Jew."[25]In
other words - whatever obliges one Jew also obliges anyone who is similar to him
in the respects relevant to Judaism. This demand is, as stated, similar to the
Kantian demand, but the "relevant respects" according to Kant, follow from all
of the qualities that can be seen as essential to man, or more precisely, to
rational beings, while the "relevant respects" in Leibowitz's work will be the
qualities characteristic of a Jew.
A demand for universal applicabitlity
also appears in the work of Leibowitz: "When I recognize that a certain command
cannot apply to every Jew for reasons that are irnmanent to it, it ceases to
apply to myself as well."[26]In
other words, the test here involves the capability to act together in accordance
with the law. The sequel, therefore, is "We will thus remove the religiously
horrifying phenomenon of demanding replacement of religious people by
unreligious people in necessary utilities, on the Sabbath. When I acknowledge,
religiously, the need to operate a certain utility, there is no basis to demand
for myself an exemption that cannot be demanded for every Jew. We have already
stated above: There is no religious life-program for religious Jews; there is
only a religious life-program for Jews."
Universal acceptance is also
demanded within Jewish tradition, but the meaning of this demand is different
than that of the Kantian demand. Kant's explanation of the fact that any type of
behavior has to be accepted universally, in order to be considered moral
behavior, follows from his view of man, or any other rational being, as a
supreme value. Therefore, the considerations to be made while deciding upon his
conduct, are not considerations regarding the personal interests of a specific
person or group of people, but practical considerations, made from a general
point of view, a point of view enabling us to express our desire to deal with
each man as an end and not only as a means. We can make such judgements from a
general point of view "if we abstract from the personal difference of rational
beings and thus from all content of their private ends."[27]
On the other hand, Leibowitz's demand for universal
acceptance results from a view of this acceptance as an expression of the fact
that man, by his very nature, is an autonomous creature, but this autonomy
possessed by man, and his ability to determine his own laws, do not make man a
supreme value. On the contrary, it is this ability which enables him to
recognize his worthlessness and the fact that he is not the supreme value.
Leibowitz stresses this difference in the motto, "I have set the Lord always
before me."[28]He
claims that this passage means "I have not set man always before me."[29]While
we can say of Kantian ethics that its motto is "I have set man always before
me."
G. Just as the difference between deontic ethics
and teleological ethics stems from differing views of man, so, it seems to me,
do the differences between a deontic religion and a teleological religion stem
from differences in the conception of man. According to Leibowitz's position,
man is an autonomous creature, he is capable, in other words, of conforming to
laws that contradict his nature. Like Kant, Leibowitz uses the concept of
liberty in its positive sense. He says, "What is man's liberty - the acceptance
of a way of life that does not follow from man's nature means - man's liberation
from his subjugation to the agent of raw nature."[30]
Thus the similarity between the position taken by
Leibowitz on Judaism, and the position taken by Kant regarding ethics, is very
great indeed, but so is the disparity between them. Just as deep as their formal
similarity is their difference in contact and in the way each of the positions
understands its specific notions. The crucial point of disparity between the two
views seems to me to reside in the fact that Leibowitz, in contrast to Kant,
sees morality not as an adversary of human nature but one of its expressions.
When man behaves morally he is not behaving autonomously at all, but in
accordance with his nature. The antithesis of behavior according to the nature
imposed upon man is morality, according to Kant, while according to Leibowitz it
is composed of artificial rules, foreign to man's needs. He says, "From a
religious point of view there is no place for the trichotomy -
nature-spirit-God; there is only a dichotomy in reality: nature which inclues
man's spirit as well, and God. There is only one way for man to deviate from the
framework of subjugation to nature's forces - adherence to God, the tangible
meaning of which is executing God's will and not man' s will... Therefore there
is no liberation from the bonds of nature except in the acceptance of servitude
to the Torah and the precepts, a servitude which does not follow from nature."[31]He also says, "Liberation from the
bonds of subjugation to nature is affected only by a religion of precepts, and
conquest of one's drives for secular moral or ideological reasons, cannot affect
such liberation." The antithesis of the natural is not, then, the spiritual, but
the artificial, in the laws of Sabbath, for instance, of which Leibowitz says,
"The whole strength of the Sabbath lies in the fact that it is foreign to the
natural way of life."[32]
This seems to me to be a problematic point. It is by no
means clear why moral conduct is conduct according to nature, while religious
conduct is not. If conduct according to nature is defined as conduct without
which human life is impossible, there is no doubt that moral conduct is
something else, and man's long history is evidence of this. If, on the other
hand, conduct according to nature is such that man can adopt it for himself
during his lifetime, even if this be done imperfectly (and here again there is
no difference between moral behavior and religious behavior: just as a religious
person must daily overcome his nature, a moral person too must constantly
overcome his inclinations), then religious conduct is no different in this sense
from moral conduct. Moral conduct, exactly like religious conduct, has at least
to be natural in the sense of its being performable for human beings, even if
its performance is imperfect, because otherwise the precepts of religion and the
imperatives of morality would be void commands, commands the execution of which
is impossible, for from each meaningful "must", a "can" must follow, even if
only a partial "can".
This is the place to note that a deontic religion, as
well, has no place for the question: "Why should I be obliged by the obligations
of religiosity?", just as in a deontic ethics the question, "Why should I be
moral?" was meaningless. Obedience to the constitutive system of religious laws
is the supreme end and any request for reasons conceives of it as a means to
something outside itself and not as such an end. The question "What for?" cannot
be applied to supreme ends.
Here, then, is the great similarity, and here is the
abysmal difference. As both the deontic ethics and the deontic religion demand
the status of "supreme court of appeals", it is imperative to decide one way or
the other. A great deal of courage is needed in order to present the
unbridgeable gap between ethics and Judaism. The price of becoming convinced of
the existence of such a gap, and therefore of the need to decide, absolutely,
between the alternative of being a religious Jew and that of being a moral
person, is indeed extremely high, too high.
[1]The term good is usually used ambiguously, we will find the
quality "good" attributed both to actions and to aims or situations. It seems to
me that in order to avoid possible misunderstandings, a distinction should'be
made between "good" which describes aims or situations, and "'honest" which
describes actions.
[2]For example in an ethical theory of the type held by D. Ross.
[3]For example, when you are operating within a specific realm of
activity, in which internal objectives are defined, the laws command you to try
to attain these objectives. When you are playing soccer the rules of the game
determine that you should attempt to reach the higher score.
[4]In his article, "Two Concepts of Liberty", in his book, Four
Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press (Londen, 1969).
[5]Ibid. pp. 121-2.
[6]Ibid., p. 131.
[7]H.A. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?", in
Moral Obligation : Essays and Lectures, Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1949), pp.
1-17.
[8]Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, L. W. Beck (trans.
Bobbs-Merrill (New York, 1959), p. l3
[9]Ibid., p. 17.
[10]Ibid., p. 65.
[11]J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press
(Cambridge, Mass. , 1971), p. 133.
[12]Political Writings, H. Reiss (ed. ), Cambridge University
Press (1970), pp. 125-130 (Appendix II).
[13]"Theory and Practice", in: The Philosophy of Kant, C.
J. Friedrich (ed. ), Random House (New York, 1949), p. 426.
[14]Foundations, ibid., p. 9.
[15](in Hebrew), Schocken, Jerusalem en Tel Aviv, 1975.
[16]Ibid., p. 22.
[17]Ibid. , p. 24.
[18]Ibid.
[19]The Concise Code of Jewish Law, G. Appel, Yeshiva University
Press (New York, 1977), p. 31.
[20]Leibowitz, ibid. , p. 14.
[21]Ibid. p. 17.
[22]Ibid. p. 21.
[23]Ibid. p. 294.
[24]ibid. p. 170.
[25]ibid., p. 204.
[26]Ibid.
[27]Foundations, ibid., p. 51.
[28]The Concise Code, ibid.
[29]Judaism, ibid., p.315.
[30]Ibid., p. 29.
[31]Ibid., p. 30.
[32]Ibid., p. 29.